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This Article sets forth two propositions. First, at a policy-making level, it is
easier to punish than it is to regulate. That is, it is easier to attract public and
political support for state-sponsored punishment than it is to attract similar
support for regulation. "Punishment, " as defined in this Article, includes any
retributively motivated government action or response.
Second, this preference for punishment may not be particularly healthy. No
doubt, there are many good reasons for supporting the government when it
imposes just deserts or communicates the public's moral condemnation.
Moreover, it is likely impossible to eradicate retributive motivations that are
hard-wired into our collective DNA. But the resources we spend on
punishment are resources that might be spent elsewhere. Even worse, by
overemphasizing punishment, we may undermine and crowd out the non-
punitive, regulatory alternatives that are more adept at averting disastrous
outcomes in the first place. Accordingly, we should worry about punishment's
effect on all government institutions, and not just on the criminal justice
system.
This Article begins that task by focusing on corporate governance
regulation and policy. The Article opens by explaining why public actors
choose retributive responses and theorizes how those responses are likely to
affect the legal institutions that dominate corporate governance law. The
Article then tackles the normative point. Although punishment offers a number
of benefits, it may leave society worse off over the long term. The Article
concludes with suggestions for further inquiry.
INTRODUCTION
Punishment has long been a preoccupation of moral philosophers and social
science researchers.' For the former group, the debate is largely one about the
' For the purposes of this Article, the term "punishment" includes all legally facilitated
responses driven by moral outrage. See Daniel Kahneman, David A. Schkade & Cass R.
Sunstein, Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES 31, 32-33 (Cass R.
Sunstein et al. eds., 2002). Accordingly, I use the term "punishment" primarily with regard
to the retributive motivations that social science researchers have found when examining
laypersons' attitudes towards sentencing and jury awards. I intend the term not to include
sanctions designed solely to internalize costs and deter socially undesirable conduct. For a
helpful discussion on the distinctions between "retributive" and other varieties of extra-
compensatory sanctions, see Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U.
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boundaries of state power; for the latter, the study of punishment is one that
focuses on how individuals experience and respond to deprivations of wealth
and liberty. 2
This Article adopts a more pragmatic approach. First, it focuses on the
public actors who impose punishment, as opposed to the individuals and
groups who experience it. Second, it identifies those characteristics of
punishment that public actors find most desirable and theorizes how
punishment's desirable qualities affect legal institutions that compete for
limited resources. As the title of the Article suggests, public actors have ample
reason to "choose" punishment over other forms of government action as a
means of attracting and maintaining public support. In the long run, however,
that preference may crowd out more innovative, forward-looking regulatory
responses to social problems. To explore this dynamic more carefully, the
Article focuses on a particular area of public policy - corporate governance.
Many of the political advantages we associate with the criminal justice
system are attributable not to the fact that a given statute enjoys the formal
"criminal" label but rather to the government's stated purpose of condemning
and imposing just deserts on wrongdoers. In other words, public actors draw
strength not from the formal definition of what constitutes a crime but from the
moral outrage laypersons experience in response to various events and crises.
This moral outrage fuels public support for varying forms of publicly
sponsored punishment. Punishment therefore arises not only in the context of
criminal law, where scholars have long debated the purposes of imprisonment
and other sanctions, but also in other areas of public life. 3
Regulatory agencies can and often do behave like retributive punishers.
Although imprisonment may be the most salient form of punishment, it is not
the only one, particularly where business organizations and their officers are
PA. L. REV. 1383, 1403-16 (2009).
Philosophers will rightfully argue that this is not the definition of "retribution" that
various criminal theorists have erected to explain why the state can and should impose just
deserts on culpable offenders. See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1619, 1665 n.230 (2010) (deriding the "many politicians, pundits, practitioners, and
others" who are not true retributivists but use the label to justify punishments unjustifiable
by "any traditional theory of punishment, including retributivism"). This Article, however,
does not focus on an idealized theory of punishment, but rather on the motivations that
social science researchers have identified as driving punishment, as well as on how those
motivations affect public institutions.
2 See infra notes 5, 18, 116 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853 (2012);
see also Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for
Preventative Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMUNOLOGY 781, 787 (2011) (arguing that goals
often associated with criminal law are in fact attributable to many types of state-sponsored
regulation). For an example of the traditional view, wherein criminal law is treated as an
exceptional source of punishment, see Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory,
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 960 & n.4 (1999).
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concerned. Accordingly, this Article distinguishes "regulation" from
"punishment," not by reference to the penalty (imprisonment or fines) or the
type of law (criminal or civil) but rather by reference to the motivations and
goals that fuel government action. When a public institution attempts to
rehabilitate, internalize costs, or restrain undesirable conduct, it acts as a
"regulator." When the same institution seeks to deliver just deserts and
communicate moral condemnation - or in lay terms, to assert blame - it acts as
a "punisher."'4 Punishers, in turn, experience an easier time attracting support
than do regulators. This preference carries numerous implications for the
public actors and the institutions they inhabit.5
Consider the Securities and Exchange Commission-as-regulator. It is fairly
easy to generate objective criteria to evaluate the SEC's welfare-enhancing
goal of protecting shareholders and securities markets. If we agree that the
collective goal of corporate law and securities regulation is to improve
shareholder welfare and maintain market liquidity, then we can objectively test
the extent to which various mechanisms accomplish their assigned tasks.6 We
also can challenge the SEC when its leaders assert that its regulations have
achieved some concrete goal.
Now consider the SEC-as-punisher. If one of the SEC's goals is to impose
retribution and express moral condemnation, how do we measure its
accomplishment of that goal at an aggregate level? How will we know when -
or more importantly, reach substantial consensus that - the SEC has, in the
aggregate and over a period of time, expressed too much condemnation or too
little? If it is difficult to define condemnation at the policy-making level in
4 Obviously, no organization is solely one or the other. Many institutions, including law
enforcement organizations, will adopt both regulatory and punishment-oriented goals, and
many will seek retributive outcomes in addition to more common regulatory pursuits such
as cost internalization. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, What's Wrong with the Sociology of
Punishment, 7 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5, 20-24 (2003) (explaining that prosecutors
can, as Rudi Guiliani did during his tenure as the prosecutor for the Southern District of
New York, act as regulators as well as punishers). For example, much of James Jacobs'
work details the way in which prosecutors used "regulatory" methods to successfully oust
organized crime from New York City's unions. See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, COLLEEN FRIEL
& ROBERT RADICK, GOTHAM UNBOUND: How NEW YORK CITY WAS LIBERATED FROM THE
GRIP OF ORGANIZED CRIME (1999).
5 Admittedly, this analysis assumes that public actors seek to maximize power and
political capital. See, e.g., Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Political Economy
of Prosecution, 5 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. SCI. 135, 136 (2009) (arguing that the study of
prosecutorial behavior "requires, at its core, understanding prosecutors as political actors
embedded in a complex strategic environment, where concerns about evaluation and
management loom large"). For more on bounded rationality, see generally Herbert A.
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
6 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529-42 (2005) (testing empirical claims made
by supporters of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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concrete terms, it is also difficult to identify SEC regulators who impose too
much or too little punishment. Punishment thus offers regulators substantially
more slack at the same time it promises them access to increased resources.
Why is it easier for the state to cast blame than engage in other types of
public action? This Article suggests three reasons. First, punishers benefit
from what some have referred to as the "psychology of punishment."7
Punishment is more intuitive than regulation,8 We do not engage in some
complicated probability-weighing exercise when we punish; instead, we punish
according to deeply ingrained feelings of moral outrage.9 Moral outrage, in
turn, enables public actors to thrive in a crowded regulatory field of limited
resources and overcome familiar problems caused by special interest lobbying
and capture.
Second, punishers draw flexibility from society's inability to define
punishment in testable, concrete terms. Even if we agree that the state should
condemn only those actors who "deserve" condemnation, or that punishment
ought to be proportional to the wrongdoing in question, we are without the
means to translate those ideals into concrete, recognizable restrictions. As a
result, public actors who punish - or more importantly, adopt public policies
whose goals are imposing punishment - can more easily justify their actions
than can their regulatory counterparts.
Finally, punishers benefit from punishment's unquestioned public
character.'0 Particularly in the corporate governance realm, regulation must
justify itself as more effective than the combined power of capital, labor, and
product markets.11 Public actors who seek to restrain or prevent various ills
must show that their prescriptions surpass or complement markets and private
contractual mechanisms as a means of improving social welfare. 12
By contrast, punishment encounters relatively little private competition. If
punishment is defined as a sanction that expresses the community's
7 See infra Part .A.
8 See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 21, 43, 46 and accompanying text.
10 See infra Part I.C. Some might say that punishment bests regulation because of our
collective "anti-administrative impulse." See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (2005) (exploring the
"unanalyzed hostility to the administrative state").
11 BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE
MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 9 (2011).
12 Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market 19 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research,
Discussion Paper No. 2023, 2003) ("The real case for laissez-faire is not that the individual
is perfect, but that the state will do worse than the private individual, and the strength of this
case has always relied more on the fallibility of the state than on the perfection of
markets."); see also Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
133, 133-34 (2006) (arguing that the presence of error in private decision making does not
necessarily justify public intervention because government actors are even more prone to
error).
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condemnation, then it is almost tautological that public actors are uniquely
situated to deliver such punishment.13  If we link punishment with the
imposition of just deserts, then the state's participation is necessary to prevent
vigilantism and to distinguish punishment from vengeance. 14 Either way,
punishment retains an undisputable public character.
For the foregoing reasons, public actors who adopt retributive,
condemnatory stances experience greater ease in securing and maintaining
resources than those regulators who limit themselves to the unromantic goals
of internalizing externalities and curing market failures. 15
This account of how and why society chooses punishment enhances several
related but conceptually distinct literatures. The first is the due process-based
concern that the boundary between criminal and civil law has become too
blurry. 16 The second is the critique of criminal law's expanding jurisdiction, or
"overcriminalization,'' 17 whereby criminal justice institutions allegedly have
taken advantage of irrational fears of crime in order to maintain and increase
13 See infra 117-121 and accompanying text.
14 MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 152
(1997) (arguing the need for state institutions, and not individuals, to impose punishment on
those who deserve it because "[r]etributive punishment is dangerous for individual persons
to carry out, dangerous to their virtue and ... unclear in its justification").
15 For more on the public's negative associations with the term "bureaucrat," see Rubin,
supra note 10, at 2092-93.
16 An excellent discussion of this erosion can be found in the 1991 Yale Law Journal
Symposium. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal
and Civil Law Models -And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1875 (1991);
Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middle Ground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1797 (1991); Franklin E. Zimring, Multiple Middlegrounds
Between Civil and Criminal Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1901, 1903-04 (1991).
For a later analysis of the civil-criminal distinction and its connection to punishment
theory, see Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 778-79 (1997).
For more contemporary critiques and analyses of potential middle grounds between
criminal and civil law, see generally Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law's Unfortunate
Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 657 (2011); Issachar Rosen-Zvi &
Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79 (2008) (questioning
and contrasting procedural protections inherent in criminal prosecutions and high-stakes
civil cases brought against large corporations); see also Markel, supra note 1, at 1383, 1437
(2009); Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 241-42 (2009).
17 For discussions of excessive criminalization, see generally DOUGLAS HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); Stuart P. Green, Why It's
a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of
Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005).
[Vol. 92:577
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power. 18  The third is the use by regulators and prosecutors of quasi-
prosecutorial actions as a means of promulgating regulation, thereby avoiding
more transparent and deliberative procedures such as notice-and-comment
rulemaking. 19
The choosing punishment dynamic suggests that these debates are
incomplete.20 For example, to the extent there exists too much punishment, the
issue is not merely one of statutory or procedural blurriness between criminal
and civil law, but rather a reflection of a deeper, intuition-driven response to
moral outrage.21  Accordingly, the resulting problem is not simply a
defendant's rights or due process issue (often the central claim of older
civil/criminal critiques2 2) but, more broadly, a threat to social welfare and
efficiency.
Having identified and explained this dynamic, the Article then sketches a
framework of how corporate punishers and regulators fare in the competition
for legal, financial, and human resources. 23 In doing so, it considers several
institutions that have made their marks on corporate governance through actual
and rhetorical uses of punishment: the SEC, State Attorneys General, and more
traditional punishers such as the Department of Justice and United States
Attorneys' Offices.
18 JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 5 (2007) (critiquing the extent to
which institutions use crime and fear of crime "to promote governance by legitimizing
and/or providing content for the exercise of power").
19 For multiple discussions of various aspects of this phenomenon, see PROSECUTORS IN
THE BOARDROOM (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011). For an earlier
account, see ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 15 (1982). For related
analyses, see Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361,
364 (2008), and Geraldine Szott Moorh, The Balance Among Corporate Criminal Liability,
Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (2009).
20 It further suggests that analyses of the relative strengths of the executive branch versus
the judicial and legislative branches are also incomplete. For example, in the corporate
context, Jonathan Macey has argued that the executive branch can move more swiftly than
courts or the legislature in responding to public outrage over various corporate scandals.
See Jonathan Macey, Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations and Capital
Markets, 115 YALE L.J. 2416, 2418 (2006). The choosing punishment dynamic adds an
additional gloss on Macey's account in that it indicates the units or departments that are
most likely to capture the public's support and compete effectively for limited resources.
21 Cf Neil Vidmar & Dale T. Miller, Socialpsychological Processes Underlying
Attitudes Toward Legal Punishment, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 565, 565 (1980) (contending
that punishment "defines social boundaries, vindicates norms, and provides an outlet for the
psychological tensions aroused by deviant acts"). For a seminal discussion of the sociology
of criminal punishment outside the corporate context, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE
OF CONTROL AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002).
22 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 16, at 1812.
23 See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
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Given the Article's focus on corporate governance, some readers may
wonder whether corporate governance regulators are in fact "choosing
punishment" at all, given the recent chorus of "where are the prosecutions?"
complaints that have been lobbed at public officials in the wake of the recent
financial crisis. 24 The very critique, however, begs the question. The financial
crisis and recession that followed are complex events caused by a number of
market and regulatory failures, some of which had far more to do with
excessive risk-taking than core criminal conduct such as fraud.2 5 That the
public nevertheless would yearn so keenly for punishment without even
knowing, much less understanding, what corporate executives knew, said, or
did suggests not a shortage of punishment but rather the psychological
underpinnings of the very dynamic this Article describes.
By the same token, regulatory critics will likely shake their heads at the
notion that regulation has lost steam in recent years, given the proliferation of
numerous agencies, regulations, and statutes, and particularly in light of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) 26 and the more recently enacted
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).27
These critics are, to a point, coTect: the Article does not deny the
24 See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime
from Task Force to Top Priority, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 972 (2010); Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Pulling Back the Curtain on Fraud Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/pulling-back-the-curtain-on-fraud-inquiries/?ref= -
todayspaper ("[I]n the two years since the peak of the financial crisis, the government has
not brought one criminal case against a big-time corporate official of any sort.").
25 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, at xiii-xiv (2010). The fact
that such risk was interconnected or systemic undoubtedly played a large role as well. See
generally Steven Schwartz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). For an argument that,
outside of financial institutions, corporate governance was not a significant cause of the
financial crisis, see Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance "Fail" During the 2008
Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 Bus. LAW. 1, 3-4 (2009).
26 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
27 Pub. L. No. 111-203, H.R. 4173. Although Dodd-Frank ostensibly was intended to
respond to weaknesses in the regulation of financial institutions, Congress included a
number of corporate governance provisions (say-on-pay and proxy access, for example) that
apply more generally to all publicly held companies.
For a general criticism of overregulation of corporate governance, see A.C. Pritchard, The
SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1073, 1093 (2005) (critiquing
the "deluge" of statutes and regulations in response to accounting fraud scandals); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance and U.S. Capital Market Competitiveness,
(forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1696303
(criticizing overregulation of corporate governance as the primary cause of the United
States' competitive decline in international capital markets). For an account of how Dodd-
Frank and its regulatory progeny have fueled a mini-legal industry, see Eric Dash, Feasting
on Paperwork, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2011, at B1 (describing the ways in which corporate
and financial regulation have spawned whole new industries to help corporations meet
regulatory and statutory requirements).
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overwhelming scope and power of the administrative state.28 The story does
not end there, however, particularly when we recognize that statutes,
regulations, and enforcement regimes can include retributive responses as well
as regulatory ones.
Accordingly, one of the lessons of the choosing punishment dynamic is that
we should supplement quantitative analyses of regulation and enforcement
with more qualitative research. If we want to measure regulation's strength
relative to punishment, then we need to look beyond an agency's size, annual
budget, and jurisdiction.29 We also have to do more than measure the number
of statutes and regulations on the books. Instead, we have to look at what a
particular agency does and consider whether its most supported agenda items
are those that we associate most commonly with regulation or those that are in
fact geared more toward expressing condemnation and imposing just deserts.30
The Article unfolds in three Parts. Part I explains why we are attracted to
punishment. Part II considers how that attraction plays out in the corporate
governance context and explores the important role moral outrage plays in the
competition between regulation and punishment. Part III sketches a normative
analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of choosing punishment and concludes
that, over the long term, punishment's drawbacks may well outweigh its
benefits.
I. EXPLAINING THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT
At first blush, the preference for punishment over regulation may seem
counter-intuitive. To the extent one equates punishment solely with "criminal
law" and "jail," one might reasonably conclude that this rather limited sub-
category of punishment is far more difficult to impose than regulation. For
example, public actors might shy away from punishment insofar as it implies
greater legal protection and, consequently, greater due process.3 Readers
28 See Rubin, supra note 10, at 2094 ("[A]dministrative agencies make the majority of
our rules and carry out the majority of our adjudications. They constitute the basic,
operational structure of modern government, and this role necessarily involves a
considerable amount ofpolicymaking.").
29 Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 258 (2007) (observing that enforcement intensity is difficult to measure by inputs
because objective data can be misleading in either direction).
30 For this reason, the series of studies that have attempted to track the size and intensity
of public and private securities enforcement in the United States and elsewhere, although
informative on numerous counts, do not illuminate whether public actors are inclined to
choose punishment or regulation in response to corporate governance failures. For more
discussion of the measurement of public and private securities enforcement intensity, see id.
at 309.
31 The standard claim is that criminal prosecutions offer defendants greater protection
than civil or administrative penalties. See Steiker, supra note 16, at 777-78. For an
argument that strongly challenges this claim in the corporate context, see Hurt, supra note
2012]
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might be even more surprised by the claim that private entities themselves
prefer punishment. After all, nobody wishes to be the source of moral
opprobrium, and certainly no rational person wants to go to jail. We therefore
might assume that well-funded private individuals and groups (i.e., the very
people who populate corporations) would respond to punishment initiatives
more vigorously than to regulatory intervention. 32 Many of these insights
caused Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite to claim, nearly twenty years ago, that
"punishment is expensive; persuasion is cheap. '33
Were we to stop here, we might sensibly conclude that punishment -
particularly criminal punishment - is a last or second-best resort for public
actors, particularly where corporate wrongdoers are concerned.34 But in fact,
at the policymaking level, where agencies and divisions compete for power and
money, punishment carries with it a number of characteristics that make it
preferable to regulation, regardless of whether the ultimate sanction is
categorized as "criminal" or "civil." I discuss these advantages in depth
below.
A. Punishment's Psychology
Under a pure rational actor model, private actors should perceive no real
difference between punishment and regulation. Instead, they should refrain
from undesirable conduct whenever the net costs of their conduct outweigh the
19, at 403-14.
32 See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy
Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 97 (2004) (citing a similar assumption with regard to
corporate crime legislation).
33 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 26 (1992). Braithwaite argued elsewhere that regulators should
adopt persuasion "as a strategy of first choice" for dealing with corporate wrongdoers. See
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: THE ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY
109 (1985). Braithwaite's analysis, however, focused on the optimal mix of persuasion and
punishment for society, without regard for the notion that public actors, and the public they
served, might derive particular benefits - psychological or otherwise - from choosing
punishment over regulation.
" For further theoretical accounts consistent with this view, see Lawrence M. Solan,
Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2211-15 (2003)
(observing that "[riemedial statutes are interpreted liberally [and] penal statutes are
interpreted narrowly" under standard interpretive canons and theorizing a model of
"statutory inflation" whereby agencies seek expansive interpretation of civil remedies,
which then lead to more expansive interpretations of parallel criminal statutes); see also
SIMON, supra note 18, at 14; Brown, supra note 16, at 682; J. Kelly Strader, White Collar
Crime and Punishment: Reflections on Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 45, 55 & n.48 (2007) ("[W]hen the grounds for criminalization are suspect,
the government should instead rely upon civil or administrative remedies." (citing Luna,
supra note 17, at 714)).
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net benefits. 35 Under this model, public actors should choose the combinations
of sanctions and detection systems that most efficiently deter costly conduct.36
The signal may differ, but the purpose of punishment and regulation is
virtually indistinguishable: the public seeks to eliminate costly conduct
efficiently. 37  Accordingly, under the economic model, fines, punitive
damages, and criminal sanctions are justifiable only to the extent they balance
out low probabilities of detection and force wrongdoers to internalize their
harms. 38
According to behavioral psychologists, the rational actor model is
unrealistic, not only with regard to those punished 39 but also with regard to
" See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 172-80 (1968); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law
as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-2.
36 Scholars have made much of the difference between systems that proscribe all conduct
(so-called "complete deterrence") and those that seek only "optimal deterrence" through
internalization of the conduct's harm. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean
"Criminal"? Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71
B.U. L. REv. 193, 199 (1991); Markel, supra note 16, at 242 (citing Keith N. Hylton,
Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L. J. 421, 421 (1998)). It
is not clear that this distinction matters under a rational actor model. If public actors are
rational, then they will seek complete deterrence only when absolute cessation of the
underlying conduct is optimal. See Fred S. McChesney, Desperately Shunning Science, 71
B.U. L. REv. 281, 284-85 (1991) (explaining that criminal sanctions represent the
legislature's determination that the conduct in question provides little or no social benefit).
17 Allen & Laudan, supra note 3, at 787 ("[The] 'law' is a collection of thick overlapping
webs of regulation, with its various justifications for action. What conventionally passes for
the criminal law is nothing but a few places on various continua of these regulatory
efforts.").
38 See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Effect and Its
Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2185, 2186 (1999).
39 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 (2004) ("[E]ven if they know the legal
rules and perceive a cost-benefit analysis that urges compliance, potential offenders
commonly cannot or will not bring such knowledge to bear to guide their conduct in their
own best interests, such failure stemming from a variety of social, situational, or chemical
influences."). For an overview of behavioral economics' implications for deterrence, see
generally Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and
Economics, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS: CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONoMIcs 403
(Nuno Garoupa ed., 2d ed. 2009).
The social norms literature has also demonstrated the important difference between
punishment and regulation insofar as punishment expresses an additional moral "signal,"
which in turn spurs second-order community sanctions (shaming, banishment) and third-
order internal sanctions such as conscience restraints. For more on the value (and
limitations) of such norms, see Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law
and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1603, 1603-04 (2000).
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those who do the actual punishing.40 We do not punish on the basis of
deliberative probability analysis. 4 1 Rather, we punish in response to visceral,
deeply held, and sometimes difficult-to-explain intuitions. 42 Moreover, the
degree of sanction is driven by moral outrage43 and various cognitive biases,
not by scientific calculations of optimal deterrence. 44 Deterrence may well be
invoked as a justification for punishment, 45 but lay intuitions about culpability
and moral outrage appear to outweigh the factors that ought to matter most
under a deterrence-based scheme. 46
41 Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of
Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 423 (2003) (highlighting an "emerging consensus
that people's punishment judgments are guided to a large degree by harm-based retributive
psychology").
41 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 171,
173-75 (2003) ("[P]eople are intuitive retributivists. Their moral intuitions are inconsistent
with the economic theory of deterrence. Those intuitions are grounded in outrage."); see
also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J.
941, 944 (2007) (arguing that the way in which individuals respond to morally problematic
situations "involves automatic non-conscious cognitive and emotional reactions rather than
conscious deliberation"). Regan goes on to explain that moral intuitions drive moral
reasoning. See id. ("[W]e do not engage in moral reasoning in order to arrive at a
conclusion. Instead, we do so in order to justify a conclusion that we have already
reached."); Vidmar & Miller, supra note 21, at 570 ("In many instances the punishment
reaction itself may be the primary response, which is followed, not preceded, by the
attribution of responsibility.").
42 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (suggesting, based on social science
evidence, that intuitive judgments, rather than deliberative reasoning, drive punishment
decisions). Scholars and researchers disagree on whether our intuitions about moral
culpability are stable and widely held or fluid, divergent, and culturally-based. Compare
Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91
MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1892 (2007) ("[A]vailable evidence suggests that human intuitions of
justice about core wrongdoing... are deep, predictable, and widely shared."), with Donald
Braman, David A. Hoffman & Dan M. Kahan, Some Realism About Punishment
Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1603-04 (2010) (attacking claims that punishment
intuitions are widely shared throughout society and arguing instead that intuitions vary and
are affected by "immense cultural heterogeneity").
" Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 32 ("We propose a descriptive theory
of the psychology of punitive awards, called the outrage model. The essential claim is that
the moral transgressions of others evoke an attitude of outrage, which combines an
emotional evaluation and a response tendency." (citations omitted)).
I Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1164-65 (2002) ("[P]unitive damages are an
expression of indignation or outrage on a scale of dollars.").
41 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. Rev. 413, 497
(1999).
46 Sunstein and others have found that subjects asked to impose punitive damages often
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Although intuitions, moral outrage, and cognitive biases influence
punishment, they do not produce a consistent, agreed-upon menu of sanctions.
We may agree that murder should receive a harsher sanction than robbery, but
we do not agree on the absolute sanctions either offender should receive.
47
Moreover, how moral outrage itself arises is not clear. Moral outrage supports
punishment, but public actors cannot simply generate it at will. 48 For the sake
of argument and for the remainder of this Article, I assume that moral outrage
is at least partially exogenous - a phenomenon that arises from events and
factors outside politicians' complete control.
In addition to being intuitive, punishment carries with it a "rhetorical
advantage. '49 That is, when groups deliberate and consider the appropriate
amount of punishment to assign culpable conduct, those members calling for
greater punishment tend to drown out those in favor of moderation.5" What
triggers this advantage is not clear, and it appears to vary by context. However
it arises, this rhetorical advantage benefits those inclined toward harsh
sanctions, since they are likely to experience little difficulty attracting
fail to consider the probability that the wrongdoer will be caught and punished, a key
component of damages under a deterrence scheme. Instead, lay punishers focus solely on
their view of the "wrongness" of the actor's conduct. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 41, at
174. Although Sunstein's piece focuses on jury-awarded punitive damages, he observes that
the psychological findings have implications for criminal and administrative enforcement
actions. See id. at 172-73. In a later study, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Forest Jourden confirm
that laypersons' views of wrongfulness alter their feelings on the appropriate length of
criminal sentences for a crime, depending on how that crime is contrasted with other crimes.
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, The Cognitive Components of Punishment, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 457, 485 (2003).
47 For experimental evidence regarding criminal punishments, see Joseph E. Jacoby &
Francis T. Cullen, The Structure of Punishment Norms: Applying the Rossi-Berk Model, 89
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245, 296 (1998). After surveying their data, the authors
conclude, "Within the broad principle that more serious crimes ought to be punished more
severely, for most offenses a broad range of punishments receives support. Almost any
specific punishment willfind some supporters and many opponents." Id. at 305 (emphasis
added); see also Kahneman, Schkade & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 36-39 (finding that
punitive damage awards are unpredictable even when "shared outrage" is present across
jurors).
48 Dan Kahan calls this the "sticky norms problem." See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges
vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000)
(explaining how social norms can undermine legislative efforts to increase punishment).
This limitation partially explains why punishment is a choice for actors seeking public
support and resources, but not the only choice.
'9 See Cass Sunstein, Outrage, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 717, 726.
50 Id.; see also Scott E. Sundby, War and Peace in the Jury Room: How Capital Juries
Reach Unanimity, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 119-20 & n.41 (2010) (citing studies
demonstrating that "when groups deliberate and an initial disagreement exists, group
members tend not to move toward a 'middle' position, but actually become even more
extreme in the direction of their original leanings").
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supporters. 51 A quick review of policies for street52 and corporate crime reflect
this advantage as well. Notwithstanding recent reform initiatives fueled by
state budget crises, criminal sentences and civil and criminal fines have moved
generally in one direction: up.
53
Thus, we punish according to intuitions and in extremes, we privilege moral
outrage over probabilities of detection, and we experience difficulty translating
our intuitions into stable, agreed-upon sanctions.
54
In addition, we are attracted to punishment's false promises of certainty and
security. Individuals interpret factual situations in order to reduce ambiguity.
55
Punishment deconstructs complex factual situations into easily digested
narratives 56 by soothing the public's psyche with reassurances that matters are
relatively simple, attributable to identifiable actors, and best of all, avoidable in
the future. 57
51 Overcriminalization is a prominent theme in criminal law scholarship. Darryl Brown
helpfully collects the literature analyzing the political economy of criminal law in
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 223 nn.l-2 (2007) (challenging the
overcriminalization thesis with empirical evidence that states have decriminalized a number
of vice and related crimes).
52 Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1276, 1277 (2005) ("The politics of sentencing over the past three decades have consistently
produced longer prison terms and an escalation in tough-on-crime rhetoric, regardless of
whether crime rates have been going up or down.").
51 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001) ("[A]Ill change in criminal law seems to push in the same direction - toward
more liability."). For a visual depiction of incarceration's upward trajectory in the United
States, see NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA 171 (2008); Doron Teichman, The
Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1832 (2005) (documenting the rise in the incarceration rate from
1980 through 2002). Although the current recession has deeply affected state budgets, it is
far from clear that the recession will affect the federal law enforcement and regulatory
institutions most concerned with corporate governance. See Barkow, supra note 52, at
1301-02.
51 Cass Sunstein argues that a similar problem pervades the punitive damages context.
See Sunstein, supra note 49, at 720 (describing difficulties for jurors who must "map" moral
judgments "onto dollars").
" See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2000) (explaining that individuals naturally tend to be overly
confident in the inferences they draw to avoid "doubt and uncertainty," in part because
doubt and uncertainty can be "paralyzing").
56 On the public's desire for narratives that accord with desires for vindication, see
generally WILLIAM FLESCH, COMEUPPANCE: COSTLY SIGNALING, ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT,
AND OTHER BIOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF FICTIONS (2009) (explaining why readers prefer
vindication narratives in fiction).
57 Tom Tyler suggests that this is one of the reasons the public enjoys law enforcement
oriented television shows such as CSI. The programs provide a form of closure and
certainty insofar as the wrongdoers are always apprehended and punished. See Tom R.
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Although much of this discussion pertains to laypersons, the same
considerations affect public actors as well. First, public actors are human and
therefore share the same emotions and intuitions as laypersons. Second, public
actors maintain self-interested motives to enact policies that garner public
support.58 Even for unelected public officials, public support translates into
prestige, power, and financial resources. Punishment is therefore valuable.
Keen observers may question whether the psychology of punishment is
unique to retributive public action. Surely, emotions 59 such as outrage and fear
motivate multiple varieties of public responses, particularly where corporate
governance is concerned.60 That is, after all, the crux of the recent critiques of
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank: they were generated by fear and hostility
more than reasoned public debate. 6' What makes punishment so different from
regulation?
The greatest difference is that when it comes to punishment, our legal
institutions are more inclined to embrace retributive motivations and
intuitions.62  Admittedly, on a case-by-case level, within criminal trials
Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and
Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1065 (2006). For a critique of the use of the term "closure" in
popular death penalty discourse, see Susan A. Bandes, Victims, "Closure, " and the
Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1-4 (2009).
58 Cf Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639, 639-41 (2010) (explaining how
political pressures influence the SEC's decision to pursue high-profile salient cases).
'9 One should keep in mind the distinction between the law and emotions literature and
the behavioral and cognitive psychology literature, which examines biases and heuristics
that distort rational decision making in predictable ways. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila
Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2018-20 (2010).
This distinction is blurred somewhat by research on the "affect heuristic," which measures
the extent to which certain emotions replace rational decision making. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 769-72 (2003). The emotions and
heuristics literatures, in turn, overlap but differ somewhat from the psychological research
portraying punishment as an automatic, intuition-driven response rather than a deliberative,
calculative one. See, e.g., John M. Darley, Citizens'Assignments of Punishments for Moral
Transgressions: A Case Study in the Psychology of Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 101,
104-08 (2010) (explaining two-track processes - intuition- and reason-based - that guide
decision making in differing contexts).
60 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2003) (arguing that combination of availability heuristic and "the political
imperative to 'do something"' in responses to crises often results in overregulation); Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1639 (2009).
61 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round
II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1821 (2011); Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40
Hous. L. REV. 77, 77-78 (2003); Romano, supra note 6, at 1528.
62 Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 673 (1989) ("Under a retributive system, the effort to
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(themselves increasingly rare) and formal administrative proceedings,
evidentiary and legal rules may reduce emotion-laden inquiries and mask
intuition-driven hunches. 63 At the policy-making level, however, intuition and
emotion reign. 64 Politicians, prosecutors, and regulatory enforcers routinely
invoke moral outrage when calling for the punishment of various corporate
individuals and organizations.65 Scholars, meanwhile, argue that we should
arrange our criminal justice institutions to take advantage of the public's
collective intuitions.66
In contrast, lawmakers and scholars have long argued that the ex ante rule-
making divisions of regulatory agencies should be steeped in a deliberative,
expertise-driven, and fact-informed decision-making process. 67  However
suppress all varieties of decisionmaking anger or sympathy is neither morally justified, nor
practically feasible. Emotional reactions to penal issues are part of basic human nature.").
Emotions, indeed, may explain inclinations to punish even when punishment is itself costly
to the punisher. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415
NATURE 137, 139 (2002).
63 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. On the failure of trial procedures to eliminate intuition-
based punishment, see William Bowers et al., Jurors' Failure to Understand or Comport
with Constitutional Standards in Capital Sentencing: Strength of Evidence, 46 CRIM. L.
BULL. 1147, 1149-51 (2010) (demonstrating through an extensive survey that many jurors in
capital trials reach sentencing decisions during the guilt phase of trial, despite admonitions
not to do so).
64 I do not mean to suggest a caricature that pits "emotional" punishers against "rational"
regulators. As I indicate throughout the piece, many public actors are likely to perform
different functions within the same job. See Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 23 (observing the
"hybridity" of punishment and regulation). Nor do I deny that emotions drive legal decision
making in numerous contexts. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Emotions, Values, and the
Construction of Risk, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 421,430-33 (2008); Todd E. Pettys, The Emotional
Juror, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1609, 1612-13 (2007). My point, however, is that we seem far
more willing to accept the emotional components of punishment than we are to accept
emotion's place in the formulation and implementation of other forms of public action.
65 This "emotional benefit" may also be attributable to the fact that public actors impose
punishment primarily through litigation. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 20, at 2440
(observing that the executive branch's most effective weapon, in comparison to Congress, is
"its ability to litigate"). Litigation, in turn, may permit public actors to act more quickly,
appear more decisive, and therefore generate greater public support. Dan M. Kahan,
Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the Executive Branch, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 48 (1998) ("Congress gets plenty of credit when it appears to
react decisively to crime, but the marginal benefit it gets from addressing crime problems in
a considered and thoroughgoing fashion is essentially nil."). Kahan's observation fueled his
larger argument that binding authority to interpret broad federal criminal statutes ought to
rest with officials in the Department of Justice (whom Kahan portrayed as clear-eyed
regulators), rather than with the "cowboy" prosecutors in local United States Attorneys'
offices. See id.
66 Robinson & Darley, supra note 42, at 18-31.
67 Cf Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
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incomplete it may be, the Administrative Procedure Act attempts, in part, to
prevent intuition-driven regulation through multiple processes of rulemaking
and adjudication.68 Institutional structures, such as the executive branch's
Office of Internal Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), 69 as well as statutory
requirements 70 that agencies document the economic effects of their
regulations, further attempt to reduce the risk that biases and heuristics will
infect regulation. 71 No doubt, scholars have criticized these innovations for
generating their own pathologies, most notably agency capture and the
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448-49 (2010) (proposing fiduciary agency model
that obligates agencies to make both deliberate and deliberative decisions); Randy J. Kozel
& Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REv. 112, 115 (2011)
(describing a mode of "prescriptive reasoning" whereby agencies make decisions "by
weighing evidence, utilizing technical expertise, and making policy choices").
68 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983) ("We have frequently reiterated that an agency
must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner .... (citations
omitted)). "[W]hatever else the [APA] set out to achieve, it aspired to strengthen
administrative procedures and judicial review to prevent arbitrary agency action." Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 473 (2003); see also Rachel E. Barkow, The
Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1337
(2008) (describing administrative law's "core ideas of predictable processes, reasoned
decisionmaking, and judicial review").
69 OIRA exists within the Office of Management and Budget and "reviews all collections
of information by the Federal Government. OIRA also develops and oversees the
implementation of government-wide policies in several areas, including information quality
and statistical standards. In addition, OIRA reviews draft regulations under Executive Order
12866." About OIRA, OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_
administrator (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (explaining the role of OIRA).
70 Although not subject to OIRA review, the SEC maintains a unique obligation to
consider the effect of a new rule upon "efficiency, competition, and capital formation." 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(2) (2006). The SEC's
"failure to 'apprise itself - and hence the public and the Congress - of the economic
consequences of a proposed regulation' makes promulgation of the rule arbitrary and
capricious and not in accordance with law." Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
71 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 223, 224 (Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2000) ("My basic suggestion is that cost-benefit analysis is
best defended as a means of overcoming predictable problems in individual and social
cognition."). Sunstein writes elsewhere, "By drawing attention to costs and benefits, it
should be possible to spur the most obviously desirable regulations, to deter the most
obviously undesirable ones, to encourage a broader view of consequences, and to promote a
search for least-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-
BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 6-7 (2002).
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perpetuation of an anti-regulation ideology.72 Nevertheless, the regulatory
world rejects in spirit, if not in fact, moral outrage and intuition as proper bases
for governance. 73  Accordingly, the psychology of punishment is useful
primarily when public actors commence litigation, impose sanctions, and set
enforcement policy; it is far less useful when they promulgate rules and
regulations.74
B. Punishment's Philosophy
Punishers benefit not only from punishment's psychology but also from its
philosophy. Criminal philosophy's venerable attempt to define and justify
criminal punishment is instructive of both just how open-ended the terms
punishment and retribution can become and how helpful open-ended
72 RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 21 (2008)
("At every stage in the development of cost-benefit analysis, commentators and
decisionmakers committed to deregulation have faithfully pursued the goals of placing cost-
benefit analysis at the center of the administrative state and shaping it towards their
agenda.").
Capture occurs when special interest groups use money and power to influence and
persuade administrative agencies not to act in ways that further the public's overall welfare.
The combination of elected legislators who require economic resources to maintain
their positions, on the one hand, and regulatory agencies that enjoy considerable
regulatory power but depend on the legislature for political and budgetary resources, on
the other, provides a recipe for a regulatory state that works to advantage well-
organized yet narrowly focused political interest groups ....
STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 9 (2008); see also Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz,
Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284-92 (2006)
(contending that regulatory capture results in deregulation); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18, 42-64
(2010) (proposing institutional mechanisms more likely to reduce agency capture by well-
funded and tightly organized industry groups).
7' A number of academics agree that the purpose of regulatory reform "is to make
regulation more effective and productive - to counter the influence of narrow interest
groups in bending rules to their selfish advantage, to avoid policies that are wasteful or
counterproductive, and to get more environmental bang for the policy buck." Christopher
C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV. 877, 880
(2010); see also REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 72, at 3 ("There is a temptation to rely
on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a
foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good
decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis.").
7' Thus, the psychology of punishment may provide an alternate, or at least
complementary, explanation for Jonathan Macey's observation that the SEC Enforcement
Division attracts outsized attention compared to other divisions within the agency. See
Macey, supra note 58, at 643-44.
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definitions can be to the public actors who routinely invoke and rely upon them
as justification for public policy.
For centuries, philosophers have vigorously debated the theoretical
justifications for criminal punishment.75 Punishment is, for many observers,
abstract and difficult to define. 76 Accordingly, in the real world, a sort of
eclecticism reigns. Consider, for example, the well-rehearsed statutory
justifications for criminal punishment. 77 The federal statute that delegates
sentencing authority to federal judges explicitly directs sentencing courts to
consider deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, in no particular order.78
The Model Penal Code, upon which a number of state sentencing statutes are
based, also offers a number of purposes for punishment, although it does not
explicitly include retribution among them.79  The wealth of meanings
accordingly provides public actors a fair amount of legal cover whenever they
voice their intention to "punish" wrongdoers.
Focusing on retribution (which is currently scholars' most favored
punishment justification8") does not improve the situation. The crux of the
retributive justification for punishment is that a person who violates society's
rules "deserves" to be punished because he is "blameworthy." 81 But decades
of philosophical debate on the topic of desert have yet to yield concrete
7' A "theory" of punishment "seeks to tell us what punishment is [and] what the
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be punishment are" whereas a
justification for punishment "seeks to tell us when it is morally (or politically or in any other
normative way) legitimate to inflict punishment." LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND
RETRIBUTION 7 (2006).
76 See Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REV. 727, 738-39
(2009).
71 See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 (2005)
("Sentences can serve many purposes, and these purposes are often in conflict.").
71 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006); Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 413,417 (1992). The two purposes of sentencing that tend to garner the most attention
are retribution and deterrence.
71 Matthew Haist, Comment, Deterrence in a Sea of "Just Deserts": Are Utilitarian
Goals Achievable in a World of "Limiting Retributivism "?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
789, 799 (2009). The American Law Institute has been revising the Model Penal Code's
sentencing provisions. For an account of the Model Penal Code's revised approach toward
retribution, as well as a critique of its embrace of limited retributivism, see Ristroph, supra
note 76, at 731-32.
'0 Haist, supra note 79, at 799. Certainly, not all scholars embrace the retributive
justification. See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of
"Just" Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 843, 975-76 (2002).
81 See MOORE, supra note 14, at 83, 91. For a useful overview of several strands of
retributive theory, see ZAIBERT, supra note 75, at 96-126; Michael T. Cahill, Punishment
Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLIcY 25, 28-31, 36-38 (Mark D.
White ed., 2011).
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guidance for policy makers.8 2  The debate has produced much criticism of
criminal law, and it has spawned numerous principles which various theorists
advocate as guides for formulating criminal legal policy. 83 So, for example,
scholars may contend that punishment has been over-imposed on risk-making
activities 84 or argue that desert should be better tied to "culpable actions. '85
But criminal philosophy has yet to distill, in a concrete and usable fashion,86 an
objective means for identifying the quantum and nature of conduct that
"deserves" punishment. 87 Indeed, lack of consensus in the theoretical sphere
has led some scholars to focus more intently on society's subjective intuitions
regarding when and how to punish. 88
The disconnect between theory and practice becomes even more apparent
when we talk about the amount of punishment that should be imposed. Most
theorists (and laypersons) cluster around some proportionality89 norm, whereby
82 The literature is far too dense to provide an adequate account here. For a sampling of
some of the twentieth century treatments of desert, see JoHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME,
AND REINTEGRATION 7 (1989); JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 56 (1970); ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 374-75 (1981); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 124-43 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 406-11
(1958). For later discussions of retribution and other justifications for punishment, see
generally CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009).
83 An example is the famous "harm principle" enunciated by John Stuart Mill and later
amplified by Joel Feinberg. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 11 (1984); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 80 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003)
(1859).
4 See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 17, at 159-77 (criticizing risk-based statutes as failing to
accord with a retributive theory of criminalization).
85 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL.
L. REV. 363, 365 (pinning responsibility on action and not results).
86 Allen & Laudan, supra note 3, at 788 ("[T]he usual commentary on the criminal law is
uniformly normative. It comprises normative critique after normative critique, but... the
critiques are almost oblivious to the actual structure of the law and applied instead to a
stripped-down, idealized version.").
87 See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 303 (2002)
("[T]he theory does not include a definition of what constitutes wrongful behavior deserving
punishment."); Dennis J. Baker, The Impossibility of a Critically Objective Criminal Law,
56 MCGILL L.J. 349, 349 (2011) (arguing that objective standards of moral wrong "are
impossible to identify").
88 The study of subjective intuitions regarding punishment is often referred to as
"empirical desert." For an overview of empirical desert and its critics, see sources cited
supra note 42.
89 From an extensive 1987 survey of attitudes on the punishment of street crimes in the
United States (known as the National Punishment Survey), Joseph Jacoby and Francis
Cullen concluded, "[P]eople want, more than anything else, for punishment to fit crimes.
When given a precisely defined punishment-selection task, people choose a punishment that
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the punishment should fit the crime. Unfortunately, the same groups disagree
on what that actually means. 90 Some focus on absolute proportionality, which
envisions a match between the wrongdoing and the punishment; others focus
on relative proportionality, which envisions comparative treatment of similarly
situated offenders.91 Neither group offers much guidance to punishers on how
much of a match (or how much of a divergence) is preferable or permitted.
At the sentencing level, the debate breaks down even further. What factors
should we include when we compare offenders: the offense only, their
respective victims, or their respective situations? Should the focus turn on the
relative ordering of offenders or relative ordering of offenses?92 None of these
issues has been resolved definitively, 93 and the Supreme Court, although
is proportional to the perceived seriousness of the crime." Jacoby & Cullen, supra note 47,
at 301 (footnote omitted). The proportionality principle extends as far back as the Bible:
The clearest and simplest version of the proportionality principle is lex talionis, the
Biblical maxim of "an eye for an eye." Lex talionis entails both the view that
punishment should be in kind (a view not often endorsed by modem retributivists) and
that the magnitude of the punishment (in whatever form) should in some sense be equal
to the wrongfulness of the act.
KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 87, at 302 (footnote omitted).
9o Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1611, 1613 (2007) ("[P]roportionality is a requirement across all major white-collar
cases; like cases should be treated alike, different cases should be treated differently and
criminal sentences should not vary substantially according to nonrelevant factors (such as
the location of prosecution, identity of sentencing judge, or heat of public emotion)."); see
also Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for Equality in Criminal Sentencing,
2002 SuP. CT. REv. 223, 269.
91 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 87, at 301-02 & n.19; Guyora Binder,
Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REv. 403, 430-31 (2011) (contrasting
"instrumental" and "comparative" proportionality). Jurists have drawn on both concepts as
well. Compare Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution
rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal offender."), with Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 331 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("Simple determinate sentencing has the virtue of treating like cases alike, but it
simultaneously fails to treat different cases differently."), and United States v. Johnson, 273
F. App'x 95, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that the "hallmark" of common law
sentencing "is that like cases are treated alike").
92 The current draft of the Model Penal Code appears to include both. See MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (listing the purposes of the
sentencing provisions: "to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity
proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders"). Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has taken the position that,
at least in the federal system, judges ought to adjust sentencing to the individual offender
and not simply the offense. See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1239-40 (2011).
93 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. at 3-5 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2007) (explaining that the new sentencing guidelines attempt to place punishments with a
"range of severity" as exact determinations of desert and proportion are typically not
possible); cf Ristroph, supra note 76, at 738-39 (criticizing the lack of precision in desert
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embracing proportionality generally, has left much of the decision making to
legislatures, judges, and prosecutors.94
Consider the folly of asking whether the Department of Justice delivered
"enough" retribution last year. Whole categories of crimes may be
undeserving (or at least less deserving) of sanctions, while several salient cases
may exist where punishment was particularly appropriate. Nevertheless, we
would have an extremely difficult time quantifying the department's overall
aggregate retributive effect.95
One might worry that this lack of consensus would stunt public actors'
ability to take action. But for public actors who punish, the lack of agreed-
upon meaning acts as a source of power rather than a restraint. Punishment is
expressively over-determined: everyone projects onto it his or her own view of
what is warranted and correct, and as a result, everyone is assured by the
public actor's embrace of "just punishment" as a government goal. 96
Consequently, punishers enjoy great political and, as I argue later, economic
discretion. They have far-ranging abilities to declare what merits
condemnation through statute, to fund enforcement units tasked with imposing
such condemnation, and to set the penalties in response to condemnatory acts.
Moreover, punishers can better protect their prerogatives because, at the policy
theory).
" See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003); Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life
and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity,
107 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1146-49 (2009) (questioning the Supreme Court's failure to
exercise robust proportionality review in non-capital cases); John F. Stinneford, Rethinking
Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 903
(2011).
95 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv.
779, 782-85, 818-20 (1994). For the same reason, studies that tabulate annual enforcement
actions or fines in the securities context tell us relatively little about whether the government
has imposed sufficient retribution. The Department of Justice's annual performance self-
review, which focuses primarily on the Department's previously set numerical targets, also
reflects this evaluative gap:
Success for the Department is highlighted when justice is served fairly and impartially
and the public is protected ... [T]rying to isolate the effects of our work from other
factors that affect outcomes over which the Department has little or no control presents
a formidable challenge....As a result, we have focused on more targeted measures of
programmatic performance...
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FY 2011, at § 11-1
(2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/pr201 l/par201 1.pdf.
96 Expressive overdetermination is Professor Dan Kahan's term for when policy
discourse enables divergent cultural groups to find affirmation of their own worldviews in a
given policy. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN L. REv. 115, 145
(2007). Kahan views this as a potentially positive development, since it allows for
otherwise "illiberal" groups to engage with each other in a participatory democracy. See id.
at 145-50.
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level, it is difficult to define retributive goals in a concrete manner that
facilitates the public's sustained oversight and intervention.
These powers are not limitless. The current economic climate has created a
scarcity of resources among numerous state law enforcement organizations at
the street-crime level, and state and local criminal law institutions have long
claimed that the public leaves them too few resources to do the job that the
public actually prefers. Nevertheless, the argument here is not that punishers
have endless resources but that they have more resources than other
government officials and that they are less likely to lose access to those
resources over time.
Nor is my claim that punishers never experience pushback from the public.
Sometimes punishers overreach and strike a public chord. The notorious
"three-strikes laws," 97 although legal, have attracted vocal, but often
unsuccessful, opposition throughout the years, as have mandatory minimum
sentencing schemes for drug traffickers. 98 Notwithstanding these relatively
few outliers, however, at the policy level, punishers have a fair amount of
latitude to do as they please, in part because we lack reliable and legitimate
methods for measuring and testing retributive policy. Our metrics are not
much more sophisticated than tabulating annual enforcement actions, criminal
cases, convictions, and fines and pointing out particularly salient wins or
losses. 99 As a result, we have little data that tell us whether our elected and
97 Three-strikes laws are statutes that impose mandatory and often draconian sentences
on third-time felons. See, e.g., David Schultz, No Joy in Mudville Tonight: The Impact of
"Three Strike" Laws on State and Federal Corrections Policy, Resources, and Crime
Control, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 557, 559 (2000). Despite strong criticism from
practitioners and academics, three-strikes laws and "get tough" regimes enjoy at least
superficial public support. See Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A
Prescription for Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2223,
2233 (2010) (observing that California's three-strikes statute was "directly enacted by
voters"); Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion
About Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 38-40 (2000) (suggesting that
public support for habitual offender laws, although palpable, may not be particularly deep).
98 See Luna, supra note 17, at 711.
99 A number of articles have addressed the lack of useful metrics for measuring and
assessing prosecutorial policy. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 983-91 (2009); Russell M. Gold,
Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REv. 69, 72-73 (2011); Ronald F.
Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 589-91 (2009). At
the federal level, see Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile " and the Allocation of Federal Law
Enforcement Authority, 43 ARiz. L. REv. 369,400 (2001).
The Department of Justice is required to file annual reports of its performance, and
engage in strategic planning. See, e.g., 31 USC § 1115 (2006). The Department's goals,
however, are quite abstract (e.g., "protect the rights of the American people"), and the
strategic targets are internally generated and quantitative in nature (e.g., "complete X
investigations of Y category of crime"). See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 95, at § 1-13-14.
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appointed officials are meeting ostensibly agreed-upon retributive goals,
assuming we could even articulate and agree upon those goals.100
By contrast, we have far more concrete goals for our regulators. We
command our regulators to improve social welfare, or in lay terms, make
everyone better off.10 1 Unlike retribution, improving social welfare is an
eminently testable social policy goal. Congress can measure a given agency's
effect on welfare when Congress makes funding and legislative decisions. 102
OIRA can subject regulation proposed by non-independent agencies to
rigorous cost-benefit analysis.10 3 And outsiders, from academia to special
interest trade groups, all have the ability to test an agency's concrete welfare-
based arguments in courts and in the court of public opinion.10 4 As a result, it
is an understatement to say that the federal regulator's job is tremendously
difficult. Without angering his political patrons, the regulator must endure
numerous criticisms as to how often and how much he has fallen short of his
concrete and testable goals.'0 5 All the more reason, then, why the regulator
Accordingly, although these reports may aid higher-level officials in cutting bureaucratic
slack, they do not appear to impose much restraint on the Department's overall ability to set
and pursue a retributive agenda.
100 Professor Cahill proposes to fix this shortcoming by theorizing his own
consequentialist framework for applying retributive justice. See Michael T. Cahill,
Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 815, 822 (2007).
101 CROLEY, supra note 72, at 10-11 ("'Public interested' regulation . . . denotes ...
regulation that improves social welfare .... [It] is therefore beneficial on net; in economic
terms, it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.").
102 This is not to say that punishers are not subject to congressional oversight or
budgetary constraints. As Dan Richman has observed, legislators can exercise political
control in a number of ways: "By strategically using oversight hearings, budgetary controls,
agency design, and restrictions on investigative options, legislators could moderate
enforcement in sensitive areas without sacrificing the symbolic and deterrent benefits of
broad prohibitions and without tackling the challenges of ex ante specification." Daniel
Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward,
58 DuKE L.J. 2087, 2093 (2009). Nevertheless, given the greater ability to measure and test
regulatory goals, legislator-principals can more easily control regulator-agents as opposed to
punisher-agents. For an overview of the various ways in which legislatures use the political
process to shape regulatory policy, see, for example, Matthew C. Stephenson, Information
Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REv. 1422, 1462-82 (2011) (describing
various strategies legislators adopt in order to ensure that regulators carry out their wishes).
103 Barkow, supra note 72, at 18 ("[U]nlike executive agencies, [independent agencies
such as the SEC] do not have to submit cost-benefit analyses of proposed rules for review
by the President's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.").
104 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (challenging
the cost-benefit analysis underlying the SEC's proxy access rule).
101 Thus, even the SEC's more measured critics have asked "whether the SEC . . . is
competitively fit to act as a regulator in a capital marketplace that is now so institutional and
global." Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of
the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (2009).
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might decide to abandon his job altogether and adopt the stance and
programmatic goals of a punisher.
10 6
C. Punishment's Public Nature
Even when corporate regulators devise rules and regulations well within the
boundaries of their enabling statutes, they still must justify these interventions
in relation to other, private alternatives. 10 7 Thus, we often encounter the
recurring refrain: Why should we expect government regulators to outdo the
market in setting optimal terms for corporate governance?10 8 Even when
markets fail, government officials can fail just as much, if not even more. 0 9
Particularly in the corporate governance context,110 private ordering and
markets occupy a strong default position in public discourse."' Accordingly,
106 One can imagine instances in which regulators simply quit their jobs or where they
attempt to morph into punishers. A robust analysis of these alternatives is beyond the scope
of this Article.
107 CROLEY, supra note 72, at 1.
10s Consider Stephen Choi's comment, which reflects a common theme in securities and
corporate governance scholarship: "Lawmakers often regulate first and ask questions later,
ignoring both the potential downsides of regulation as well as the possibility of market-
based alternative solutions to market failures." Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the
Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45, 48 (2004).
109 Behavioral economists' study of systematic cognitive error arguably has undermined
the market default argument. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 46, at 459-60. Even
here, however, some contend that markets can overcome decision-making error as well as, if
not better than, regulators. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 60, at 50-51 (arguing that
competition among regulators may reduce regulation infected by biases and heuristics).
Other research suggests that intermediaries or agents in business organizations are less
likely to exhibit certain biases. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley,
Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2002)
(reporting experimental research showing that use of corporate agents greatly reduced
alleged "endowment effect" in corporate business transactions).
110 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728-29 (1984) (justifying mandatory disclosure
rules by reference to market failure).
The preference for markets and private ordering, in turn, relates back to Ronald Coase's
mid-twentieth-century prediction that - "in the absence of significant externalities,
information asymmetries, or garden-variety transaction costs - the law can (and should)
defer to the attempts of private parties to allocate rights and obligations optimally." Arlen,
Spitzer & Talley, supra note 109, at 2 (citing R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1960)). Not surprisingly, Arlen et al. conclude, "[Therefore,] corporate
law should generally avoid imposing immutable (or 'mandatory') rules, except when
necessary to address conventional market failures .... Id.
I Bernard Harcourt attributes private ordering's ascendance to, among other things, the
convergence of a number of economists and law and economic scholars at the University of
Chicago throughout the mid- and later-twentieth century. See HARCOURT, supra note 11, at
136-39 (describing the importance of "the Chicago School" to free market rhetoric in
2012]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WRE VIEW
regulators must defend their market interventions as both necessary and
useful.112
Punishment, by contrast, carries little of regulation's ideological baggage.' 13
Once we agree that a certain class of persons deserves punishment, we are far
more likely to accept the government's role in channeling and expressing the
public's condemnation and in imposing just deserts. 114 If we are, as Professor
Jodi Short recently documented, fearful of government regulation, our fear
ironically does not extend to the state's imposition of retributive
punishment.1 1 5
Several scholars have attempted to account for the public's dichotomous
attitudes toward regulation and punishment, with mixed results. Bernard
Harcourt traces the dichotomy to the University of Chicago's law and
economics school, whereas Nicola Lacey suggests that the difference lies with
a country's political make-up (in other words, the more socialist a country is,
the less punitive it is).1 16 Neither of these accounts, however, incorporates the
vast and growing literature on the psychology of punishment.
American governance).
112 Some see this as a form of regulatory "minimalism." See Charles F. Sabel & William
H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53,
55-56 (2011) (arguing that regulatory "experimentalism" is more pervasive than most
presume and also more desirable than minimalist approaches).
113 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1196 (1985) (explaining fraud liability as a protective device for markets). But see
HARCOURT, supra note 11, at 136-39, 147 (critiquing Posner's account because it does not
explain "why certain categories of purportedly efficient behavior are criminalized" and
because it ignores the complex "institutional framework" on which voluntary market
transactions rely).
114 See SIMON, supra note 18, at 21; Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge,
87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1059-60 (2007) (exploring the justifications for a state monopoly on
punishment); Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 911, 918
(2007) ("[T]he provisioning of criminal justice services, at least beyond the field of law
enforcement, remains the exclusive province of the state.").
115 In her recent article, Jodi Short provides empirical evidence that the public's
discontent with regulation results not from concerns about inefficiency or administrative
cost but rather from a deep-seated fear of state power. See Jodi Short, The Paranoid Style in
Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGs L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 2-3, 47-58),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1739015.
116 Bernard Harcourt has traced the dichotomous attitudes toward regulation and
punishment to neoliberalism, on the one hand, and to Richard Posner's famous justification
of criminal law as a protection device for market transactions, on the other. See HARCOURT,
supra note 11, at 147. Nicola Lacey adopts a "political systems" explanation for
punishment, arguing that, among industrialized countries, those with more socialist and
representative political systems favor less punishment. See LACEY, supra note 53, at 115-
16. Neither Harcourt's nor Lacey's account incorporates the vast psychological literature on
how laypersons view and experience punishment. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying
text.
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In the public sphere, punishment's domination is best explained by its
expressive component, which lends the state a powerful argument in justifying
its monopoly and also accords with the psychological literature indicating the
public's desire to express its moral outrage."I7 If punishment is the means by
which society communicates its moral condemnation of bad acts, then the state
is society's most appropriate proxy for communicating such condemnation.' 18
Even if we delegate certain functions to private or quasi-private individuals" 19
(or allow punitive damages in tort120 ), in the contemporary world, we are
inclined to anoint the government as the preeminent source of punishment.
2 1
D. Punishment's Practical Advantages
The three foregoing sections demonstrate punishment's general allure to
government actors: it is non-deliberative and channels moral outrage; it is
difficult to define and therefore difficult to test or criticize; and it is
unquestionably public in character. Given these benefits, what practical
payoffs might we see for institutions that "punish" as opposed to institutions
that "regulate"? 22 In this section, I explore three categories of advantages:
legal tools, money, and human talent.
17 For an introduction to the notion of criminal punishment as an expressive tool, see
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternate Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594-605
(1996) (explaining the "expressive dimension" of punishment); Dan Markel, Are Shaming
Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative
Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2191 (2001) (describing "theories of penal
encounter centering on retribution and social denunciation").
Treating retribution separately from punishment's expressive function does not lessen the
state's claim. Retributivists embrace the state's involvement because its involvement (and
use of procedure) distinguishes the imposition of "just deserts" from ordinary vengeance.
See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 14, at 152.
118 See Bilz, supra note 114, at 1062; Steiker, supra note 16, at 803-09. For an argument
that expressive arguments are insufficient to explain or justify different treatment of
criminal law, see Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 16, at 108-11.
I19 Roger Fairfax has documented instances in which state governments sometimes farm
out the prosecution function to private attorneys. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of
the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 416
(2009). Ric Simmons and David Sklansky have also observed the rise of private policing.
See Simmons, supra note 114, at 919; David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1165, 1168 (1999).
120 See Markel, supra note 16, at 241.
121 Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against
Privately Inflicted Sanctions, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 82, at 129;
Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 149, 171 (2010).
122 Most institutions do both. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 20-24 (exploring
Rudolph Giuliani's skillful use of a hybrid of regulation and punishment with regard to
'crime on the streets and crime in the suites"). This "hybridity" is related to but distinct
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Admittedly, whether punishment creates identifiable benefits for a given
institution is ultimately an empirical question whose answer is beyond the
scope of this Article. Because punishment spans different jurisdictions and
types of institutions, it is not particularly easy to isolate or measure a
"punishment effect." Yet, we can at least theorize where punishment's payoffs
are most likely to occur, which can provide the basis for future testing.
1. Legal Tools
Since roughly 1970, society has permitted, if not encouraged, the enactment
of redundant and repetitive criminal statutes, as well as the imposition of
increasingly harsher penalties for violating such statutes. 123 The expansion in
criminal law has led to the robust "overcriminalization" critique that is popular
among practitioners and scholars. 124
The political explanation for criminal law's predominance is that
legislatures enact broad criminal laws and impose harsh jail sentences because
such conduct sends positive signals to an unhappy public while shifting the
details of implementation and sentencing to less visible prosecutors and
judges.1 25 Criminal legislation is cheap: it enables lawmakers to demonstrate
to the public that they are "doing something," pleases the lobbies that are most
vocal, and yet allows the same lawmakers to avoid responsibility for
unintended consequences that arise from the prosecution (or declination of
prosecution) of those laws. 126
The choosing punishment dynamic broadens our understanding of this
phenomenon. First, it reminds us that moral outrage, and not the labeling of a
law as "criminal," drives public action. 127 Second, it further explains why
public actors, responding to the public's desire for punishment, are likely to
trend toward adjudicative, ex post solutions over more forward-thinking
innovative procedures.1 28 Adjudication includes a communicative element. 129
from the phenomenon of overlap and leakage between civil and criminal penalty systems.
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, What Are the Rules ifEverybody Wants to Play? Multiple Federal
and State Prosecutors (Acting) as Regulators, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra
note 19, at 202, 203 (observing that numerous civil settlements are negotiated "in the
shadow of criminal liability").
123 See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 53, at 507.
124 See supra notes 17, 18, 51 and accompanying text.
125 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REv. 715, 751-52 (2005);
Stuntz, supra note 53, at 529-33 (distinguishing federal and local legislators' incentives).
126 Kahan, supra note 65, at 50; Stuntz, supra note 53, at 548-51.
127 See Beale, supra note 122, at 203.
128 For a discussion of the various shortcomings of the adjudicative, case-by-case
approach, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN
THE BOARDROOM, supra note 19, at 177, 195-96 (discussing accountability and consistency
concerns). The choosing punishment dynamic is also consistent with Robert Kagan's theory
of "adversarial legalism," whereby policymaking and dispute resolution occur primarily
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Punitive enforcement actions - to the extent they conclude in an agency's
favor - are more likely to gamer public support, particularly when the public
seeks the comeuppance of a given set of corporate actors. Experimental,
quasi-rulemaking procedures, by contrast, are difficult to explain and therefore
difficult to justify to an angry public. Whenever outrage is present, regulators
ought to lose out to punishers.
Finally, the choosing punishment dynamic reminds us that punishment is not
a mere sanction that follows chronologically and derivatively from regulation.
To the contrary, punishers take an active role in shaping the laws and legal
processes that determine future sanctions. In the wake of scandals and crises,
punishers routinely lobby legislatures for additional substantive laws, enhanced
procedural powers, and expanded jurisdiction.130 Punishers do not sit on the
sidelines while regulators make law. Rather, punishers play a strong role in
law's creation.
Of course, punishers are not the only public actors who shape law. Much of
the law that arises in the form of statutes and regulations seeks to regulate and
not necessarily to express blame or condemn others. Nevertheless, it is no
accident that Sarbanes-Oxley contained a number of provisions that improved
the government's ability to punish suspected corporate fraudsters. 1 1 Nor is it a
through "lawyer-dominated litigation." See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3
(2002). Kagan distinguishes adversarial legalism from "other methods of governance and
dispute resolution that rely instead on bureaucratic administration, or on discretionary
judgment by experts or political authorities." Id.
129 1 recognize that criminal theorists such as Moore separate out expressive
condemnation from retributive punishment. See MOORE, supra note 14, at 84-90. The
psychological literature, however, suggests a greater overlap between the two, whereby the
condemnation of the wrongdoer is part of the desert.
130 An instructive example is (now former) Acting Assistant Attorney General Rita
Glavin's testimony in March 2009 before the House Committee on Financial Services. See
Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor Protection Laws:
Hearing Bejbre the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111 th Cong. (2009) (statement of Rita
Glavin, Acting Assistant Att'y General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Another
example is Glavin's testimony before the House Judiciary Committee one month later. See
Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect Taxpayers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) [hereinafter Proposals to Fight Fraud and Protect
Taxpayers] (statement of Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division,
Department of Justice). In both instances, Glavin was seeking to persuade Congress to
enlarge the DOJ's statutory and financial power.
131 For a discussion of Sarbanes-Oxley's criminal and enforcement-related provisions,
see Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 392-411
(2004). Some of these provisions had little to do with the accounting fraud that triggered
Sarbanes-Oxlcy. See, e.g., Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of
Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 438-40 (2009).
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coincidence that one of Dodd-Frank's more popular provisions was its
inclusion of an increased bounty for whistleblowers whose reports lead to
successful SEC enforcement actions.132  Laws can contain blaming
components alongside regulatory provisions.
Some observers might wonder if the competition between punishers and
regulators for legal tools is problematic, particualrly where statutes are
concemed. After all, law is not a finite resource like money. There is no
technical cap on the number of statutes that legislatures can enact.
Nevertheless, legislators have only so much time and human capital to spend
on the political process in a given year. Accordingly, if punishers and
regulators both seek certain types of legal tools, we should expect punishers to
find greater ease in securing the tools they desire the most.
2. Money
Overlapping laws and regulations do not mean much if public actors lack
the budgets necessary to enforce them. If punishers have an advantage
securing substantive legal tools (i.e., statutes and regulations), does that
advantage also translate into additional funding and heftier budgets? Put
another way, to what extent does an institution's punitive orientation toward
corporate entities influence its funding relative to other public agencies?
This question is not easily answered, and differences are likely to arise
between federal and state institutions.13 3 In the corporate governance context,
one need not search long for claims of underfunding by regulatory or law
enforcement agencies. The SEC has often claimed itself to be the victim of a
dearth of funds, 134 despite a growing regulatory and enforcement portfolio.
35
132 For more on the SEC's whistleblower program as enhanced by Dodd-Frank, see
Whistleblower Program, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/whistleblower.shtml; see also Douglas W. Baruch
& Nancy N. Barr, The SEC's Whistleblower Program: What the SEC Has Learned from the
False Claims Act About Avoiding Whistleblower Abuses, HARV. Bus. L. REV. (July 25,
2011), available at http://www.hblr.org/2011/07/the-secs-whistleblower-program-what-the-
sec-has-learned-from-the-false-claims-act-about-avoiding-whistleblower-abuses/.
133 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can
Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 521-23 (2011) (examining allocations of
power between local and more centralized prosecuting authorities within states and the
federal government).
134 See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF
FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 364 (2009), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf ("[Doria] Bachenheimer also
attributed the SEC's failure to uncover Madoffs Ponzi scheme to a lack of resources: 'The
resource issues and the challenges that we were facing .... We had to buy our own legal
pads. We had to buy our own pens. It got to the point where we didn't have paper for the
printers. . . . We had cases that had remained open for years."'); U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC'S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS
REGARDING ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD'S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME 26 (2010), available at
[Vol. 92:577
CHOOSING PUNISHMENT
The FBI too has claimed, at times, a lack of funds, including in connection
with the financial crisis. 136 Since government units include both punishers and
regulators, it is difficult to determine whether an agency's punitive bent
improves, reduces, or has no effect on its funding.
Nevertheless, all things being equal, punishment ought to improve an
agency's funding prospects at the margin. That is, it ought to be easier to
secure funds when the public is in a greater mood to punish and when the
public institution requesting the money has made a public commitment to
deliver such punishment. 137
Consider the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) of 2009.138
While Congress debated the massive Dodd-Frank bill for over a year, FERA
garnered strong bipartisan support in just a number of months. 139 In addition
to altering several statutes and rolling back a court decision on money
laundering, FERA provided law enforcement agencies significant resources for
the investigation and prosecution of financial crimes. 140 Indeed, over a two-
year period, FERA authorized the injection of an additional $500 million into
the FBI, the Secret Service, and a number of additional agencies with
jurisdiction over crimes ostensibly related to the financial crisis. 141 Of course,
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/201 0/oig-526.pdf; see also Jayne W. Barnard,
Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 71 U. PITT. L. REV.
403, 407 (2010) (concluding that Khuzami and his lieutenants "walked into a[n
Enforcement] Division that was under-resourced, demoralized, and insecure").
135 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in
Search of a Story, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 899, 902.
136 Eric Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave of Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2008, at Al.
137 This certainly has been the case with the public's response to street crime. See, e.g.,
SIMON, supra note 18, at 45-46; Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence
and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 173, 226 (2008) (observing an increase in punishment resources for street crime
and a consequent defunding of social institutions that might otherwise mitigate or moderate
crime); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IowA L. REV. 219, 257-58 (2004).
138 See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat.
1617 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
139 For more on FERA's drafting and quick passage, see Matthew Titolo, Retroactivity
and the Fraud Enforcement andRecovery Act of2009, 86 IND. L.J. 257, 298 (2011).
140 See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 § 3. For an argument in favor of
increasing the DOJ's resources for fighting fraud in the wake of the recession, see Proposals
to Fight Fraud and Protect Taxpayers, supra note 130, at 12 (statement of Rita Glavin,
Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
141 Subsequent testimony by one of the co-sponsors of the bill, Charles Grassley,
demonstrates the bill's intended breadth. See Protecting American Taxpayers: Significant
Accomplishments and Ongoing Challenges in the Fight Against Fraud: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley,
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given the statute's broad definition of what counts for funding purposes,
tracing the statute's underlying goals to the agencies' subsequent performance
is nearly impossible. 142
FERA aptly demonstrates the benefits of choosing punishment: Congress
funds enforcement but grants punishers a relatively free hand in deciding how
to spend and use those funds. Given the broad definition of goals, legislators
struggle to offer sustained critiques of the enforcement agencies' use of those
funds. Punishers thus benefit not only from their ability to secure legal tools
but also from their ability to secure the funding necessary to implement such
tools.
3. Talent
Finally, punishment ought to create an advantage for agencies in attracting
human capital, or the dedicated and gifted employees I refer to collectively as
"talent."
A number of commentators have written lately about the "revolving door"
between the SEC and private business. The theory, espoused by Stavros
Gadinis in the academic literature and Michael Lewis in the popular press, is
that SEC administrators and regulators purposely treat corporate actors with
kid gloves because they hail from the private sector and intend to return there
in a few years. 143  Ostensibly, the revolving door reduces regulation's
effectiveness. Regulators, more worried about their employment prospects in
the future, fail to do their jobs in the present. 144
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at 2011 WLNR 1939026.
142 See section 3(f)(1) of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, which
permits funding for "criminal, civil, or administrative violations ... involving financial
crimes and crimes against Federal assistance programs, including mortgage fraud, securities
and commodities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds related to Federal
assistance and relief programs."
The following subsection provides that funding may also be used for training and
research, including "programs for improving the detection, investigation, and prosecution of
economic crime including financial fraud and mortgage fraud." Id. § 3(f)(2). This latter
provision also provides funding for listed agencies to assist state and local criminal
enforcement agencies in investigating the above listed crimes. See id. The authorization
thus includes, on its face, funding for the prosecution and investigation of conduct that had
no connection whatsoever with the financial crisis that allegedly spurred the enactment of
FERA.
143 See Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, Op-Ed., How to Repair a Broken Financial
World, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 3, 2009, at WK1O; Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial
Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers 6 (Aug. 11, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-
1333717.
4 See Ramirez, supra note 24, at 974 (suggesting that federal prosecutors shy away
from local corporate prosecutions out of a desire to maintain future job prospects). For a
refutation of this thesis, see CROLEY, supra note 72, at 95 ("More likely, the future
[Vol. 92:577
CHOOSING PUNISHMENT
Interestingly enough, few have successfully advanced similar arguments
with regard to the United States Attorney's Office in Manhattan, even though
the members of that office also often advance to notable positions within
private practice. 45  If anything, the revolving door prospect increases
prosecutorial aggression with regard to corporate prosecutions. 146  What
accounts for the difference?
Perhaps we can answer that question by identifying variations in the
populations that seek employment with the government in the first place. To
the extent that punishment enjoys a better narrative than regulation, we should
expect lawyers seeking employment to prefer punishment to regulation.
Punishers often bask in the warmth of heroic narratives, while regulators toil in
relative obscurity. 147 If, according to popular narratives, punishers are heroes
and regulators are technocrats, then institutions that adopt a more punitive
stance ought to enjoy an advantage in the initial competition for legal talent.
True, differentiation in terms of skills, geography, personal tastes, and interests
should modify punishment's inherent advantage. We should not be surprised
when a prosecutor sometimes jumps ship for a top position within a given
bureaucracy or when some law students lean toward more transactional,
regulatory positions in desirable locations such as New York City or
employment prospects of administrative regulators depend entirely on the regulators'
experiences with regulatory issues, not on particular decisions that were friendly to an
interest group or groups."). Langevoort also has questioned the revolving door theory. See
Langevoort, supra note 135, at 904-05.
145 Cf David Zaring, The Southern District of New York Offers Riches, CONGLOMERATE
BLOG (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/08/-the-southern-district-of-
new-york-offers-riches.html (demonstrating strong job prospects for prosecutors from the
Southern District of New York office, which has also taken on a number of well publicized
corporate prosecutions). For an earlier study, see Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long,
Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON.
627, 627 (2005) (finding that prosecutors in high-private-salary districts were less likely to
agree to plea bargains than counterparts in other districts).
146 Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 7 J.L. EcON. & POL'Y 617, 630-31
(2011) (arguing that prosecutors retain incentives to try famous or notorious cases in order
to become prominent in the field and seek lucrative private sector jobs).
These divergent accounts suggest that the private sector may provide differing incentives
for lawyer-regulators and lawyer-prosecutors. If corporate law firms hire prosecutors
because the firms value aggression and strong litigation skills, then prosecutors have every
incentive to win trials and strike hard bargains. By the same token, if corporate law firms
hire legal regulators because the firms desire negotiating skills and network contacts with
other regulators, then they are likely to value the lawyers' abilities to negotiate and
persuade. Accordingly, the revolving door may encourage aggressive behavior among
prosecutors while simultaneously rewarding more conciliatory behavior by lawyer-
regulators.
141 SIMON, supra note 18, at 41.
2012]
B OSTON UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIE W
Washington, D.C. Nevertheless, within otherwise similar public institutions, at
the staff- or line-attorney level, punishment ought to outshine pure regulation.
Should there be any doubt about this point, one need only look to recent
changes within the SEC's Enforcement Division. Although the SEC had
always portrayed itself as a punisher where insider trading was concerned,
148
since the discovery of Bernard Madoff's fraud in December 2008 (precipitated
solely by Madoff's startling admission), the SEC's Enforcement Division has
recast itself as an all-purpose investigator and punisher. First, the SEC
Commissioner removed certain impediments to initiating and pursuing
investigations. 149 Second, and perhaps more importantly, it replaced its top
enforcement personnel. Robert Khuzami, the former chief securities
prosecutor at the United States Attorney's Office, became the Chief of
Enforcement. He recruited two former prosecutors from the same United
States Attorney's Office to work for him in high-level positions.1 50 Notably,
the SEC did not fill those positions with career SEC attorneys.
Once in office, Khuzami enacted a number of reforms to remake the
enforcement division in the image of a local prosecutor's office. 51 He reduced
the number of supervisors and sent many of them back into the field,
reorganized the division into subject-matter units devoted to investigating
particular types of transgressions, announced his intention to expand
cooperation programs from entities to individual cooperators (a tool that
148 See Coffee, supra note 29, at 264-65 (citing Illegal Insider Trading: How Widespread
Is the Problem and Is There Adequate Criminal Enforcement?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Linda Thomsen, Director,
Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission)) (discussing the number of
enforcement actions brought over a five-year period). Insider trading continues to be an
enforcement priority. See, e.g., SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC.
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last
modified Oct. 6, 2011) (touting a forty-three percent increase in the number of cases filed
from the previous year).
149 The SEC (a) eliminated the "penalty pilot program" that had required Enforcement
Division attorneys to obtain the SEC's approval prior to negotiating penalties with corporate
defendants and (b) streamlined the process for initiating investigations and serving
subpoenas. See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Schapiro's SEC Expected to Step up Enforcement,
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2009, at D01 (analyzing Schapiro's then-expected termination of the
penalty pilot program); Marisa McQuilken, Rising Stock: SEC Enforcement Lawyers Are
Happily Picking up the Pace, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, at 1 (discussing the Enforcement
Division's increased role in general); Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Sustainable Reform Prioritizing Long-Term Investors Requires the Right
Orientation (Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/20l0/spch0205l0l
aa.htm.
"'0 Barnard, supra note 134, at 406-07.
15' Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks
Before the New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug, 5,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm.
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criminal law enforcement agencies already used), and went on a public
relations kick that included a positive depiction in the New York Times as the
public's new, star crusader. 15
2
These changes alone do not necessarily transform the Enforcement Division
into a punisher; they could as easily improve the agency's ability to levy a
form of regulatory discipline through ex ante regulation and administrative and
civil fines that sought to do no more than internalize costs ex post. 15 3 But
Khuzami's public stance -broadcast in speeches, congressional testimony, and
newspaper features - indicated something more than pure welfare-enhancing
deterrence; it signaled that the SEC was gearing up for both retributive
punishment and the increased budget and attention that accompany it. 15 4
II. PUNISHMENT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Part I offered a generalized theoretical account of punishment's various
comparative benefits. This Part explores the choosing punishment dynamic
with regard to corporate governance policy. It juxtaposes the so-called
regulatory institutions that affect corporate governance law with the punitive
institutions that have played an increasingly larger role in demanding how
corporations and their managers should behave.
Section A begins by surveying the traditional non-punitive mechanisms
familiar to corporate governance practitioners and scholars. The four standard
sources of corporate regulation (both public and private) are markets,
shareholder democracy, litigation, and public regulation. I refer to these
mechanisms as "non-punitive" because at least in theory they are intended not
to communicate moral condemnation or impose just deserts, but rather simply
to restrain socially undesirable conduct. In theory, too, these mechanisms are
driven by rational deliberation and not by intuition and heuristics.
152 See Jenny Anderson & Zachery Kouwe, The Enforcer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at
B1; Louise Story, The Generals Who Ended Goldman's War, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2010, at
BU1; Edward Wyatt, S.E.C. Puts Wall Street on Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2010, at B 1.
153 Cf Coffee, supra note 36, at 193-97; Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of
Punishment, reprinted in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 25, 26-27
(Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) (distinguishing "punishment" from penalties that are "mere
'price-tags' attached to certain types of behavior that are generally undesirable, so that only
those with especially strong motivation will be willing to pay the price").
151 See Wyatt, supra note 152, at B1. Promising punishment and imposing it are two
very different things. Accordingly, although Khuzami has employed a substantial amount
of punishment rhetoric in his defense of the Enforcement Division, commentators (most
notably, Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York) have roundly criticized the
Division's practice of securing fines from financial institutions with no admission of guilt.
See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Behind Rakoff's Rejection of Citigroup Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/behind-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-
s-e-c-citigroup-settlement/ (explaining Judge Rakoffs reaction to the SEC's policy of
settling cases without any admission of guilt).
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All four mechanisms share well-documented weaknesses, which I review
briefly for those unfamiliar with the topic. Although scholars have mined this
field for years, they have yet to consider the extent to which corporate
punishment impacts these regulatory shortcomings. Similarly, scholars have
failed to consider the extent to which regulatory infighting among proponents
of markets, voting, or litigation creates opportunities for punitive institutions to
enter the fray and secure a larger-than-expected role in shaping corporate
governance policy.
Section B then introduces the reader to the concept of corporate punishment.
The institutions described in this section often proceed under statutes that are
only incidentally tied to corporate governance. Legislators have crafted these
statutes with broader ills - fraud, misrepresentation, noncompliance - in mind.
Nevertheless, these laws provide public actors ample opportunity to punish
corporate govemance lapses.
Finally, section C offers an account of why corporate punishment is not
likely to yield to corporate regulation any time soon. The public has
increasingly registered greater moral outrage in response to corporate
governance scandals. Moral outrage, in turn, fuels retributive motivations and
therefore supports those institutions best poised to take advantage of such
motivations.
A. Corporate Regulation
When we think of corporate governance law, we often think of state
corporation law and, increasingly, federal securities law. To varying degrees,
state corporate governance law betrays a preference for non-retributive legal
mechanisms.155  Investors rely on a combination of private and public
institutions to impose an amoral form of restraint, sometimes referred to as
"discipline," albeit in a non-retributive kind of way, on corporate managers and
directors. When this type of restraint or discipline works, shareholder welfare
improves and theoretically so does that of society as a whole. This is the
predominant agency-cost 56 explanation of corporate law and governance, and
it is far removed from the moral intuitions that guide retributive punishment. 157
155 Corporation law's preference may reflect its law-and-economics influence. See
Arlen, Spitzer & Talley, supra note 109, at 2.
156 Judge Posner succinctly defines agency costs as follows:
A principal hires an agent to do a job that the principal could not do as well (or as
cheaply) himself. The principal wants the agent to strive to do the best possible job at
the lowest possible cost .... But the agent is a self-interested person just like the
principal. Unless the principal can evaluate and monitor the agent's performance with
great accuracy and adjust the agent's compensation accordingly, the agent is unlikely to
be perfectly faithful to the principal. He will slack off, or divert revenues to himself, or
both.
Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What if Anything Should Be
DoneAbout It?, 58 DuKE L.J. 1013, 1015 (2009).
117 Steven Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory
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This is not to say that morally informed arguments are absent in corporate
settings. To the contrary, a number of scholars have argued that moral
considerations can and should pervade decision making within the corporate
sphere. 58 Nevertheless, with the exception of the SEC's Enforcement
Division, the legal institutions that dominate corporate governance law have
tended to shy away from the nakedly retributive claims that are prevalent
elsewhere. 15 9 Instead, agency-cost reduction prevails across scholarly and
judicial arenas. As I demonstrate below, this singular interest in reducing
agency costs, in turn, results in a world in which scholars and practitioners
identify and debate - with relative ease - the various flaws in the institutions
that are supposed to regulate corporate governance.
1. Markets
For libertarians and free market adherents, private markets remain the
optimal means for incentivizing good behavior by corporate actors.160 When a
Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 316 n.23 (2007) ("[O]ptimal
corporate governance would minimize net agency costs." (citing John E. Core et al., Is U.S.
CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160-
61 (2005))).
158 See, e.g., Thomas Joo, Narrative, Myth, and Morality in Corporate Legal Theory,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1091, 1092; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does
Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1047 (1997); Lynn A. Stout, On
the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don't Want to Invite Homo
Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (2003).
In a related vein, a number of scholars have discussed the positive effects of social norms
on corporate behavior. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate
Governance Reform: Why Importing US. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1055, 1086-87 (2004) (discussing informal reputational sanctions visited
upon corporate managers in the wake of various scandals and mishaps); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811, 1824-25 (2001).
159 Consider a recent Delaware Court of Chancery decision that rejected a derivative
shareholder suit premised on the board's failure to perceive and prevent Citigroup's
disastrous participation in the subprime mortgage business:
[I]t is often difficult to distinguish between a desire to blame someone and a desire to
force those responsible to account for their wrongdoing. Our law, fortunately, provides
guidance for precisely these situations in the form of doctrines governing the duties
owed by officers and directors of Delaware corporations. This law has been refined
over hundreds of years, which no doubt included many crises, and we must not let our
desire to blame someone for our losses make us lose sight of the purpose of our law.
In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009) (second
emphasis added).
160 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization ofAmerican Corporate Governance, 1 VA.
L. & Bus. REv. 10, 24 (2006) ("[A] robust market for corporate control is vitally important
as a corporate mechanism for monitoring and disciplining managers."); see also Stephen J.
Choi & Eric L. Talley, Playing Favorites with Shareholders, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 271, 273-74
(2002) ("[T]he takeover market creates a powerful incentive for managers to constrain their
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corporation produces a substandard product, fewer people purchase it. At
some point, the corporation's revenues and profits fall. 161 As profits fall, the
firm's value also decreases, and fewer investors purchase or hold the
company's stock, assuming a liquid market for such stock.' 62 As its stock
price plummets, the (publicly held) corporation becomes vulnerable to a hostile
takeover by outsiders who perceive an opportunity to extract greater value
from the firm's underlying assets. 163 Alternately, the corporation's board may
become the subject of an insurgent proxy contest or vexatious litigation by
disgruntled shareholders. To head off these problems, the board replaces its
officers and ushers in a different team and management strategy.164
Unfortunately, markets alone cannot restrain managerial opportunism. 65
Information asymmetries undermine market efficiency, as do legal restraints -
such as those on hostile takeovers. 66 Moreover, officers are likely to hide
corporate wrongdoing from shareholders intentionally. At least where insider
trading is prohibited, capital markets cannot efficiently discipline officer-
driven wrongdoing while the wrongdoing is kept under wraps. 167 We therefore
need additional mechanisms to restrain managerial incompetence and
opportunistic behavior.
own rapacity in the interests of self-preservation.").
161 ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 15 (1970) ("The customer who, dissatisfied with the product
of one firm, shifts to that of another, uses the market to defend his welfare or to improve his
position; and he also sets in motion market forces which may induce recovery on the part of
the firm that has declined in comparative performance."); see also Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767,
768-69.
162 See Hurt, supra note 19, at 389.
163 JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN
118 (2008).
16 Id. at 235 ("Hostile takeovers are associated with increases in managerial efficiency,
as high share price is considered the strongest hostile takeover defense.").
165 See William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 653, 726-27 (2010).
166 For a criticism of statutes that impose such restraints, see, for example, MACEY, supra
note 163, at 118. For the response that legal takeover defenses do not undermine market
discipline as much as one might expect, see Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 871, 896-97 (2002).
167 See Hurt, supra note 19, at 389-90. Even here, however, the market provides a long-
term disciplining device insofar as shareholders might completely exit or discount a market
whose issuers were deemed untrustworthy.
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2. Shareholder Democracy and Board Oversight
Aside from selling their stock, shareholders might take matters into their
own hands by exercising their vote over various corporate affairs. 168 All states
follow, to some extent, the structure whereby shareholders elect board
members and board members bear the responsibility for hiring and firing
corporate officers. 169 Theoretically, directors restrain officers through their
oversight capacity, and shareholders restrain directors through their ability to
elect them into or out of office.
According to the traditional critique, this type of restraint fails on two fronts.
For one, directors are too removed from the corporation's daily affairs and
identify too easily with the corporation's officers. 170  Additionally,
shareholders of publicly held firms do not fare much better because they are
widely dispersed, unsophisticated, and uninformed.' 71 As a result, the classic
collective action problem renders them rationally apathetic. 72
Some evidence suggests that this account of governance futility is overly
pessimistic. The emergence of third-party intermediary shareholders such as
hedge, 173 pension, and mutual funds174 reduces the problem of shareholder
apathy, although these entities arguably introduce other, equally problematic
16 Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355,
1359 (2010) ("Under the standard agency theory guiding efforts to empower shareholders,
increased monitoring by shareholder-principals of manager-agents will reduce agency costs
created by management shirking and expropriation of private benefits .... ).
169 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.").
170 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23-44 (2004).
171 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-90 (1935).
172 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971). Macey's argument is slightly more nuanced. He
contends that dispersed holdings render shareholders unable "to form effective political
coalitions to block management's political mobilization" against market discipline. See
MACEY, supra note 163, at 235.
173 See Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive
Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41, 83
(2008); Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 302-03 (2008).
174 Among the three, commentators have lauded hedge funds as offering the best
opportunities for reducing agency costs. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach
Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U.
L. REV. 225, 228-29 (2007); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1042-43 (2007).
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agency problems. 175 Similarly, shareholders have demonstrated a surprising
adeptness with the SEC's precatory proposal machinery. 176 This has led some
to argue that corporate managers enjoy less omnipotence than they did in the
past. 177 Nevertheless, shareholder democracy, by almost all accounts, is an
insufficient source of managerial discipline.
3. Shareholder Litigation
The most controversial source of restraint in corporate governance law is
shareholder litigation. 178 By many accounts, this form of restraint is quite
weak;179 some would either eliminate or reduce its influence even further. 180
To bring a derivative suit on the corporation's behalf, shareholders must
clear procedural demand and ownership hurdles. 181 Such hurdles exist because
171 Rose, supra note 168, at 1359 ("[A]lthough shareholder power may result in reduced
agency costs due to management empire-building, other agency costs are created that may
reduce the effectiveness of or even outweigh the gains from shareholder power."); see also
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1293 (2008).
176 Rule 14a-8 requires management to include on the corporate proxy advisory
shareholder proposals of 500 words or fewer, provided the proposals meet certain criteria
laid out by the rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). "[Such proposals] have had a
powerful admonitory effect on corporate boards, with corporate boards often voluntarily
assenting to non-binding proposals rather than risking wrath at the next director election."
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 Bus. LAW. 1079, 1095-96
(2008).
177 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEx. L. REV. 987, 1044-45
(2010). Shareholders still are not permitted to vote on most matters affecting the company.
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
34-35 & n.25 (2008) ("In all states, the corporation code provides for a system of nearly
absolute delegation of power to the board of directors.").
178 ToM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: How LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 1 (2010) ("Because public regulators
cannot oversee every company at every moment and cannot anticipate or even respond to
every report of a potential wrong ... [shareholder] lawsuits ... fill an important gap in the
regulatory framework affecting American business.").
179 See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 108 (2006) ("A
combination of substantive doctrines and procedural requirements embodied in corporate
law has made it nearly impossible for shareholders to prevail when challenging the
decisions and practices of corporate management.").
180 See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring
the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule l0b-5, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1301, 1305-07 (2008) (arguing for granting the SEC power to "prescreen" shareholder
lawsuits before they can be filed).
181 See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
§ 14.03 (3d ed. 2009).
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the corporation's decision to engage in litigation, like most other aspects of
governance, is seen as a prerogative of the corporation's board.18 2
Substantive law also constrains shareholder litigation, through, among other
things, the business judgment rule' 83 and statutory provisions enabling
corporations to insure, indemnify, and exculpate directors under certain
circumstances. 1
84
The foregoing leaves a fairly narrow window for shareholder derivative
suits - and a nearly closed one for suits seeking damages for oversight
failures. 185  Only where undisclosed conflicts of interest, bad faith, or
intentional violations of law are present is there much likelihood of a
derivative suit going forward and succeeding. 86  By that point, we would
expect to see "punishers" - criminal prosecutors, State Attorneys General
182 See In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(stating that directors' power to decide whether to file a suit on the corporation's behalf
follows from the general precept that power to manage the corporation's affairs resides with
the board). Shareholders may forego demand if they demonstrate that such demand is futile
by pleading facts that raise doubt that the board is disinterested and independent or that the
transaction in question was the product of the board's "valid business judgment." Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). When the alleged misconduct relates to inaction and not a specific
transaction, the test is whether the pleadings raise doubt as to the independence of the board
when the complaint was filed. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 (Del. 1993)
(substituting an alternate test when the claimed misconduct is the board's alleged inaction).
183 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of
the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141 (a). It is a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981))).
184 Delaware permits corporations to include a charter provision exculpating directors
from monetary liability for lapses in the duty of care. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (2001). The corporation also may secure director and officer liability insurance
for liability stemming from decisions that harm the corporation, although D&O insurance
will stop short of protection for bad faith acts or intentional misconduct. For an introduction
to the D&O contracting process, see BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 178, at 42-56.
185 Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 125 ("The presumption of the business judgment rule, the
protection of an exculpatory § 102(b)7 provision, and the difficulty of proving a Caremark
claim together function to place an extremely high burden on a plaintiff to state a claim for
personal director liability for a failure to the see the extent of a company's business risk.").
186 See, e.g., In re Am. Int'l Grp. Inc. S'holder Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763,
799 (Del. Ch. 2009) (permitting the case to go forward where there was significant evidence
of criminal activity).
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(SAG), and SEC enforcement agents - on the scene. 187 We also would expect
to see claims filed under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act.188
Meanwhile, federal law also places a number of procedural restraints on
shareholder class action litigants. They must bring their claim in federal
court, 189 abide by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act by alleging
scienter with particularity in their complaint, and await the court's
determination of a motion to dismiss before discovery commences. 190 Despite
these elaborate hoops, private enforcement actions proceed and account for a
substantial percentage of securities class action recoveries. 191  If private
litigation is a poor source of regulation, it is not because class actions fail but
rather because, even when they succeed, the suits largely result in circular
payments by the company to its previous shareholders.
4. Public Regulation
Apart from markets, shareholder democracy, and private litigation, public
regulators also play a role in corporate governance. 192 The SEC is the primary
federal agency charged with protecting the integrity of the security markets and
with protecting investors in publicly held companies. Historically, the SEC
has not regulated corporate governance but rather the sales and purchases of
securities. 193 Nevertheless, over the years, the SEC's jurisdiction has expanded
from mandating adequate and truthful disclosure to overseeing internal
governance relationships and structures.194
187 For an extensive account of how multiple litigations are directed at the same firms,
see Jessica Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud. An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA
L. REv. 49 (2011).
188 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 178, at 3-5 ("Among [shareholder litigation] claims,
securities class actions represent, by far, the largest potential source of liability.").
189 Section 101(a)(1) of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, 3227, provides that securities fraud class actions on behalf of
more than fifty members or prospective members "shall be removable to the Federal district
court for the district in which the action is pending."
190 See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-l(b)(1) (2006) ("In any private action arising under this
subchapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any
motion to dismiss, unless the court finds, upon the motion of any party, that particularized
discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.").
191 Coffee, supra note 29, at 245.
192 From the economist's perspective, public regulation "aims to induce outcomes which
would not be reached by free market activity. It is therefore designed to overcome some
perceived instance of market failure." Anthony Ogus, Criminal Law and Regulation, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 39, at
90.
193 George W. Dent, Jr., For Optional Federal Incorporation, 35 J. CORP. L. 499,
509 (2010) ("[T]he SEC's jurisdiction is limited to matters like disclosure and proxy
solicitations; it does not extend to corporate governance in general.").
194 See generally Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas - The
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Regulation can intervene ex ante, in the sense that public regulators can
promulgate prospective rules and standards that dictate, directly or indirectly,
how individuals or groups should behave. The SEC's regulation of the
processes for issuing stock, filing quarterly and annual statements, and
conducting tender offers are all examples of how it regulates the stock market.
The SEC's requirements regarding audit and compensation committee
independence and disclosure of codes of business conduct are also examples of
regulation, albeit regulation directed at how corporations govern themselves.
Regulation also can occur ex post in the sense that regulators can fine,
enjoin, or otherwise sanction behavior that transgresses previously announced
rules and standards. 95 Ex post enforcement, however, overlaps but is not co-
extensive with punishment. That is, an enforcement division can levy
increased penalties solely for the sake of internalizing costs by taking into
account low probabilities of detection. No doubt, some of the SEC's bread-
and-butter enforcement likely falls within this category. As I argue below,
however, the public regulators who staff the SEC's Enforcement Division
increasingly have adopted goals beyond mere cost internalization. They have
in various instances decided that it is necessary to punish corporate officers
and not simply restrain bad conduct. Accordingly, I discuss the world of
corporate punishment in greater detail below.
B. Corporate Punishment
If we rely on markets, shareholders, litigation, and regulators to restrain
corporate actors, on whom do we rely to punish them? The three institutions
that attract the most attention are the federal Department of Justice (DOJ) and
its United States Attorneys' Offices, the SEC, and the SAGs. As I argue
below, all three of these institutions have been aided by the relative
weaknesses of the regulatory institutions discussed in section A above.
1. The Department of Justice
Criminal law's influence over corporate governance is complex. Unlike a
state's corporate code, criminal law does not explicitly address the relationship
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J.
Conp. L. 79 (2005).
195 For an in-depth analysis of the difference between structural regulation and sanction-
based systems, see Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating
Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 655 (2006). For more on the difference between rules (which
are defined in detail ex ante) and standards (which attain definition ex post), see Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 565 (1992).
For an analysis of how rules and standards (or principles) affect securities enforcement and
securities rule-making, see Cristic L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-
Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (2008), and James Park, The Competing
Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DuKE L.J. 625 (2007).
2012]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
among corporate directors, officers, and shareholders. Technically, one does
not go to jail for being a bad director or for violating fiduciary duties. 96
Nevertheless, many federal criminal statutes "punish" corporate misconduct
in the sense that they communicate moral condemnation for conduct that is
also the concern of corporate governance policy. Although insider trading and
the fraud statutes (mail, wire, and securities fraud' 97) embrace the corporate
crimes that most easily come to mind, many other statutes respond to
governance transgressions within the corporation. Basic embezzlement and
theft statutes extend the state's power to punish corporate officers who abuse
their position and take corporate property. 198 Document preservation statutes
obligate corporate employees to preserve evidence; certification statutes force
CEOs and CFOs to learn and affirm the content of their public companies'
financial statements. The failure to comply with these and similar laws
provide ample grounds for punishment. 99
Finally, the federal government maintains the particular ability to punish
corporations for nearly all of their employees' federal crimes through a broad
theory of respondeat superior °00 So long as an employee commits a crime
with an intention to benefit the company and in the course of her employment,
the employee's conduct triggers entity-level liability for the corporation.20'
196 Arguably, the "honest services" provision of the federal fraud statutes had been
interpreted so broadly as to criminalize mere violations of fiduciary duties. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (2006) ("[T]he term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible fight of honest services."). The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Skilling v. United States appears to have cut off this expansion, at least for now.
See 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2930-31 (2010) (holding that the "honest services" statute could pass
muster under constitutional vagueness doctrines if restricted to "offenders who, in violation
of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes"). For previous criticism of
the broad reading of the honest services statute, see Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words:
Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties Through Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services
Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 8 (2010).
"' See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud); id. § 1348 (securities
fraud); 15 U.S.C. § 78u to 78u-4 (securities fraud).
198 The Manhattan District Attorney successfully prosecuted Dennis Kozlowski, the
former CEO of Tyco, for committing and conspiring to commit grand larceny. See Andrew
Ross Sorkin & Roben Farzad, At Tyco Trial No. 2, Similarities to No. 1, N.Y. TIMES, June
20, 2005, at Cl.
199 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements); id. § 1350 (officer certification
requirement); id. § 1520 (destruction of corporate audit records). On the criminal aspects of
Sarbanes-Oxley and officer certification, see Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the
Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45, 61-62 (2004).
200 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94
(1909).
201 Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, 1517
PLI/CoRP. 815, 817 (2005).
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Corporate criminal liability serves an important "blaming function" that
Professor Samuel Buell has discussed at great length.20 2 According to Buell,
corporate criminal liability communicates a message both to society and to the
members of a given corporate institution, "a kind of moral assessment [that is]
characteristic of judgments of criminality. '20 3 Although Buell, like other
observers, presumes that moral condemnation is tied to criminal law,
retributive messages can be conveyed by other non-criminal institutions, which
I discuss in greater detail below.20 4
2. The Securities and Exchange Commission
As this Article has argued throughout, retributive punishment thrives
beyond the limits of criminal law. Relatively recent changes in the SEC's
Enforcement Division nicely demonstrate this point. On one hand, the
Division's bread-and-butter docket would seem to fall squarely under the
amoral "regulatory discipline" rubric: through compensatory fines,
disgorgement, and other remedial measures, the Division can correct and deter
securities violations and thereby contribute to more efficient markets and
improved corporate governance.
But the Division also can impose retributive punishment. That is, through
punitive fines, coerced public admissions of guilt, and similar measures that
imply moral as well as legal responsibility, the Division communicates public
blame and condemnation.
This was not always the case.20 5 Prior to 1990, the Enforcement Division's
primary powers included seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and filing
202 See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 477 (2006) (identifying the "popular impulse to condemn entities criminally for the
harms they visit upon people" as the driving force behind federal prosecutions of corporate
entities).
203 Id.
204 Id. at 478 ("Because of its communicative force and preference-shaping authority,
only criminal process fully produces these effects of legally imposed entity blame."); see
also Brown, supra note 16, at 668 n.31 (arguing that criminal law "has a distinct ability to
express condemnation for blameworthy conduct that civil sanctions do not").
This Article does not dispute the general contention that criminal law is more retributive
than other forms of legal sanction. It does contend, however, that we should not ignore the
retributive aspects of civil enforcement proceedings. For more on the extent to which
federal agencies engage in retributive conduct, see generally Minzner, supra note 3.
205 Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 19-20 ("The SEC remained a non-punitive regulatory
agency into the 1980s."). John Braithwaite theorizes that the SEC was influenced by United
States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani's decision to criminally prosecute Wall Street financiers:
Giuliani shocked the world by being a Republican who reversed the deregulatory
persona of Ronald Reagan. He brought the symbolism of the War on Crime to where it
was not supposed to be seen. Police officers were filmed marching into Wall Street
investment houses and emerging with exquisitely besuited men in handcuffs ....
Giuliani's strategy was crude but effective. It was about symbolism rather than
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civil suits in court seeking injunctive relief; neither activity was particularly
steeped in the rhetoric of punishment. In 1990, however, Congress enlarged
the Enforcement Division's power to seek civil penalties beyond
disgorgement. 20 6 Whereas disgorgement was a weak penalty, fines and similar
penalties offered the SEC the opportunity both to deter wrongdoing and to
express moral condemnation of the individuals or groups who transgressed the
securities laws. The Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Hudson v. United
States,20 7 which effectively narrowed the definition of "criminal" for double
jeopardy purposes, also encouraged the SEC's more widespread use of civil
fines and remedies. 20 8 Under the Court's reading of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, the SEC was free to impose civil fines on entities that were also the
subject of criminal proceedings, provided the fines were not so "punitive in
form and effect" as to render them "criminally punitive. '20 9 The Court
explicitly stated, however, that those fines might well be described, "in
common parlance," as punishment.2 10
Despite its increased statutory powers, the Enforcement Division did not
flex its punitive muscle during the Bush Administration's tenure. This fact
raises something of a conundrum: if punishment is more powerful than
regulation, why did the SEC Enforcement Division falter in the 2000s?
The question deserves its own treatment.2 1   Suffice it to say that the
Enforcement Division seemed to suffer from its adoption of a more regulatory
stance in the years leading up to the Madoff debacle. It appeared to follow,
rather than lead, SAGs such as Eliot Spitzer in terms of investigations and
settlements. 21 2 It erected a number of internal rules that hampered its staff
equality before the law.
Id.
206 Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-429 § 202, 104 Stat. 931, 937-39 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2).
207 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
208 See Gary P. Naftalis, Defending Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, SM090
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1257, 1314 (2007) (citing Paul Beckett, SEC May Seek Civil Fines in Some
Cases Involving Parallel Criminal Proceedings, WALL ST. J., Jan 8, 1998, at B6).
209 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104-05. Hudson directs courts to consider civil penalties
according to a multi-factor test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168-69 (1963). See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100. For a good discussion of how the Court's
analysis has enabled administrative agencies to impose retributive penalties, see Minzner,
supra note 3, at 908-10.
210 See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
537, 549 (1943)).
211 A number of scholars have already begun to investigate this question. See, e.g., John
C. Coffee, Jr. & Hilary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 701, 731 (2009); Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The
SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 803-04 (2009) (arguing that SEC failed to show adequate
leadership in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis).
212 Coffee and Sale have argued that "[s]tate securities regulators . . . have been
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attorneys' abilities to investigate and charge civil and administrative securities
cases. 213 And its Chairman required SEC attorneys to seek approval from the
full Commission prior to initiating formal investigations and serving subpoenas
on individuals and entities suspected of wrongdoing. 2 14
Following the emergence of the financial crisis and the election of President
Barack Obama, former prosecutor Robert Khuzami was chosen to become the
new director of the Enforcement Division.21 5 Khuzami enacted a number of
changes designed to make the Division act and appear more like a criminal law
enforcement agency.2t 6 Small wonder, then, that the Enforcement Division
appears to receive far more attention than the rest of the agency and that the
attention is fairly positive. 21 7
Khuzami's "retributive tum," however, has inherent limitations. The
Division may lack the statutory power to dictate corporate governance
arrangements and, accordingly, punish governance mishaps. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the SEC's punitive bite is limited substantially by
its inability to initiate criminal charges, by congressional oversight and control
over its budget, and to a lesser extent by the Supreme Court's determination
that civil penalties must not mimic criminal punishments excessively. In other
words, not all punishers (or would-be punishers) are created equally. If
criminal prosecutions and jail terms remain the preeminent means by which we.
communicate moral condemnation, 21 8 then the SEC will always be weaker than
other punishers, regardless of how aggressive its enforcement agents sound in
newspaper interviews. 21 9
important fraud detectors and arbitrators, who have, at times created competition pressuring
the SEC to take action." Coffee & Sale, supra note 211, at 760.
213 See Peter J. Henning, Should the SEC Spin off the Enforcement Division?, 11
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 121, 125-26 & n.20 (2009).
214 Id. at 126 ("The criminal investigatory model appears to be the dominant approach
[within the SEC] these days.").
215 David Scheer & Jesse Westbrook, SEC Names Ex-Prosecutor Khuzami to Head
Enforcement (Update 1), BLOOMBERG NEWS (February 19, 2009, 15:17 EST), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=azMOC7v8_Ies.
216 Khuzami, supra note 151; see also Barnard, supra note 134, at 405.
217 Macey, supra note 58, at 643 ("[I]t is clear that the SEC is largely evaluated on the
basis of how well its Division of Enforcement performs.").
218 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 609, 616 (1998).
219 Statutorily, the SEC has no power to initiate a criminal prosecution; that power
resides exclusively with the DOJ and its United States Attorneys. See SEC Div. of
Enforcement, Office of Chief Counsel, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 5.2 (2011); see also Neal
Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal
Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 561 (2003). One SEC Commissioner, Luis Aguilar,
has argued for the Enforcement Division's own criminal prosecution authority. See Luis A.
Aguilar, SEC Comm'r, Speech Before the North American Securities Administrators
Association's Winter Enforcement Conference: Empowering the Markets [sic] Watchdog to
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This mismatch between retributive stance and retributive power
foreshadows one of punishment's drawbacks: sometimes, punishment amounts
to little more than distracting talk, and this distracting talk may become
particularly harmful if it simultaneously reduces an agency's determination to
regulate.
3. State Attorneys General
Finally, in addition to the SEC and federal prosecutors, state prosecutors
have increased their ability to punish corporate actors through a proliferation of
state securities fraud statutes. 220 Eliot Spitzer altered the corporate regulatory
landscape in the 1990s when he relied on New York's Martin Act 22 1 to
investigate conflicts of interest within Wall Street advisory firms. 222 Other
states have joined New York in investigating corporate misconduct and
opining on corporate governance matters. 223
Like the SEC, the SAG can impose penalties and remedial obligations that
fall along various points of the retribution-restraint spectrum. Unlike the SEC,
the SAG is not nearly as circumscribed in its use of retributive penalties and
rhetoric. Although nearly all of the New York Attorney General's securities-
Effect Real Results (Jan. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/
spchO I10091aa.htm.
220 See Douglas Branson, Trekking Toward Ober Regulation: Prospects for Meaningful
Change at SEC Enforcement?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 545, 561-64 (2010) (cataloguing a
number of securities and corporate governance scandals whose investigations were
spearheaded by SAGs and not the SEC); Timothy Meyer, Federalism and Accountability:
State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
885, 886 (2007) (describing how SAGs have "used litigation to become a regulatory force at
the national level").
22' The Martin Act provides both civil and criminal penalties for, inter alia, fraud,
deception, omission, false pretenses, or false statements used to induce or promote the
purchase or sale of securities within or from the state of New York. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 352-c (McKinney 1996). For an analysis of the ways in which the Martin Act exceeds the
scope of the federal securities laws (and therefore favors the New York Attorney General
with greater leverage), see Kulbir Walha & Edward Filusch, Current Developments, Eliot
Spitzer: A Crusader Against Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight
Hound? A Case Study of Eliot Spitzer and Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1111, 1116 (2005).
222 For a discussion of the New York Attorney General's securities enforcement record
under Eliot Spitzer's leadership, see Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and
Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption
of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 952 (2005).
223 For a survey of state offices and their stance toward securities fraud and similar
violations, see Lori Martin, David Zetlin-Jones & Kimberly Chehardy, The Investment
Management Institute: Enforcement Trends and Themes, 1802 PLI/CORP 333, 341-42
(2010).
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related investigations have ended in global structured settlements, 224 the office
still may easily convert a deserving case into a criminal prosecution, and its
leaders have not hesitated to emphasize the blameworthiness of the industry
and corporate entities involved. 225
Also unlike the SEC, the SAG combines criminal and civil authority under
one umbrella, which offers greater leverage, greater investigative power, and
greater ability to secure - and spin - a positive outcome. Moreover, whereas
the SEC is a single-issue agency, beholden to Congress for funding, the SAG is
a multi-purpose agency and therefore potentially more difficult to control in
terms of state budgets. 226 Finally, unlike the SEC, whose commissioners are
appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress, the SAG is a popularly
elected official who enjoys a substantial measure of independence from the
state governor's office as well as the state legislature.227 The SAG's political
incentives therefore support a more aggressive, if also publicity-seeking,
agenda.
C. Corporate Punishment and Moral Outrage
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, corporate governance is made up
of two very different worlds. The world described in section A is one with
which corporate scholars and practitioners are intimately familiar. It is also
one characterized by fragmentation and criticism.
These critiques, however, tend to miss an equally important but different
world, whose leaders gain strength from retributive motivations and what
psychologists often refer to as moral outrage. 228 This is the world that has
224 See Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM, supra note 19, at 182-85.
225 See, e.g., Statement of Attorney General Andrew Cuomo Relating to Bank of
America and Merrill Lynch, Office of the Attorney General, Media Center (Aug. 3, 2009),
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media center/2009/auglaug3a_09.html (describing the
timing and disclosure of Bank of America's and Merrill Lynch's 2009 bonuses as a
"surprising fit of corporate irresponsibility").
226 Daniel Richman has observed that Congress can more easily influence enforcement
policy through funding (for better or worse) when the relevant agency is responsible for a
small portfolio of issues. Daniel Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 793-99 (1999).
227 For a recent analysis of the political power of state attorneys general, see Margaret
Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 698, 702 (2011)
("[A]ttomeys general in most states are independent from the state legislature and governor,
representing different constituencies.").
228 1 do not mean to ignore corporate punishers' outputs, because their settlements often
do include structural reforms that prosecutors and regulators justify in utilitarian terms such
as deterring wrongdoing and improving capital markets. See Brandon Garrett, Structural
Reform Prosecutions, 93 VA. L. REv. 853, 863-64 (2007). Nevertheless, corporate
punishers draw power not from their reformatory goals but rather from their embrace of the
public's retributive motivations.
2012]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
become increasingly visible to the general public, particularly in the aftermath
of various scandals and crises.22
9
To the extent retributive motivation is tied up in moral outrage, the gap
between these worlds may be quite understandable. In prior decades, corporate
wrongdoing, particularly the type of wrongdoing classified as "white collar
crime," received little response from prosecutors, legislators, and judges. 230
Over the past several decades, however, those attitudes have changed
considerably.2 31 In the wake of the corporate fraud scandals that began the
new century, the federal government swiftly and noisily prosecuted a number
of corporate chieftains 232 and increased criminal sanctions for corporate-related
frauds. 233 Even before then, sanctions for corporate crime had steadily risen
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
234
If public actors have changed their tune about corporate crime, then this
change appears to be synchronous with society's attitudes.235 Few members of
the public protested Bernard Madoff's term of 150 years' imprisonment, the
type of sanction one would expect for a serial killer or violent gang leader.
236
229 Jonathan Macey attributes this power to a number of political and structural factors
that accompany the modem administrative state. See Macey, supra note 20, at 2418-19
(explaining how executive branch power has enabled the SEC to become the locus of
"corporate law enforcement" for civil litigation and has also empowered the SAGs and DOJ
in terms of corporate criminal enforcement).
230 See, e.g., Stuart Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 501, 514-16 (2004); cf Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 14
(arguing that "[j]ust deserts thinking.., had almost no impact on business regulation" in the
1970s among punishment theorists).
231 See, e.g., Cullen, Fisher & Applegate, supra note 97, at 32-33 (citing studies
demonstrating "changed public attitudes and increased public support for using the criminal
law to sanction white-collar offenders"); Maurice Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 443, 500-01 (discussing studies documenting change in attitudes
toward white collar crime and antitrust offenses).
232 Donald Langevoort observes that the government did the same with Ivan Boesky and
others in the wake of the junk bond and savings and loan crisis. See Donald Langevoort,
The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices A bout Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84
WASH. U. L. REv. 1591, 1620 (2006).
233 See James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons
fiom Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REv. 859, 860-61 (2006) ("[The] regulation of public firm
management, as it has occurred, is too oriented towards the punishment of directors and
officers.").
234 See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After
Booker, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 167, 167 (2008).
235 See Francis Cullen, Jennifer Hartman & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Bad Guys: Why the
Public Supports Punishing White-Collar Offenders, 51 CRIM. L. Soc. CHANGE 31, 33
(2008).
236 Madoff Sentence Cheered, Seen as "Strong" Message, CNBC (June 29, 2009),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/31610169/Madoff SentenceCheeredSeen as StrongMessage.
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To the contrary, the general public has evinced a growing need to hold
corporate managers accountable for the harms they have caused, and the
accountability they seek differs from the sanitized account of cost
internalization that law and economic scholars supply.2 37  Whether this
development stems from a growing distrust of large, powerful organizations, as
Donald Langevoort has suggested, 238 or from a more venal need to protect "our
most treasured possessions [retirement accounts]," as Christine Hurt has
observed, is largely beside the point.239 When corporate crises and losses
occur, demands for punishment follow. Public actors, in turn, hear those
demands and respond accordingly.
240
Given the foregoing, we can safely assume that punishment-oriented
institutions will continue to play an important role in shaping the corporate
governance landscape. Accordingly, it is a mistake for scholars to ignore
retributive motivations when considering how to design the optimal corporate
governance regulatory regime. It is an even greater mistake to assume that
corporate regulators will remain non-punitive when moral outrage becomes
ascendant. With that understanding, I now proceed to the normative question:
Is choosing punishment good for society?
III. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF CHOOSING PUNISHMENT
In the preceding Parts, I explained why public actors might choose
punishment over alternate forms of intervention and how that choice
manifested itself in the corporate governance context. In this Part, I sketch the
theoretical benefits and drawbacks of choosing punishment, with the strong
caveat that future empirical and theoretical inquiry is warranted. Nevertheless,
the discussion concludes on a decidedly negative note: Like birthday cake,
punishment is extremely satisfying in the short term but not particularly
healthy over the long term.
237 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 135, at 902. Professor Ribstein attributes some of
this outrage to the ways in which corporate business is portrayed in popular culture. See
Larry Ribstein, How Movies Created the Financial Crisis, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1171,
1175-77; Larry Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, 1 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 165, 166 (2006).
238 Donald Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate
Law's "Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems," 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 965 (2006)
(commenting that the public increasingly has sought greater transparency and oversight of
institutions "that have significant political, economic, or social power, whether public or
private").
239 Christine Hurt, Of Breaches of the Peace, Home Invasions, and Securities Fraud, 44
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1365, 1368 (2007) ("These new penalties reflect our society's fears for
our retirement castles and peaceful capital marketplaces.").
240 See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Hell Hath No Fury like an Investor Scorned:
Retribution, Deterrence, Restoration, and the Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under
Rule 1Ob-5, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 3, 7 (2007).
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The first half of this Part explains punishment's theoretical value as a
backstop for regulation. By increasing the costs of noncompliance and
expanding resources for detection of noncompliance, punishment can help
restrain corporate opportunism. 24 1 Moreover, it reinforces governance norms
by coordinating society's response to instances of deliberate wrongdoing and
by assuring shareholders and other "good corporate citizens" that their trust in
others is well-founded. Finally, punishment offers public actors a means to
overcome regulatory pathologies such as capture and bureaucratic inertia. The
public admired Eliot Spitzer because he seemed to have the ability to rise
above regulatory paralysis when other agencies seemed unable or unwilling to
do so. 2 42 In a world where regulation is weak and regulators are either
captured or tied up in red tape, retributive punishment may offer public actors
a powerful yet flexible alternative. 243
The story is not all positive, however. Because punishment focuses on the
moral aspects of corporate misconduct, it has a tendency to transform complex
gray-area questions into black-and-white parables. It encourages us to look
backward, not forward.244 And, worst of all, it has the tendency to block
regulatory innovation and creativity because it attracts talent away from the
tasks of governing, managing, and improving institutions and corporate policy,
and it instead places that talent squarely in costly, time-consuming adversarial
tournaments. 245
241 Erickson, supra note 187, at 51 ("Corporate managers, like burglars or tax evaders,
are less likely to engage in misconduct if they know that this misconduct could expose them
to legal liability.").
242 See, e.g., Brandon Garrett, Collaborative Organizational Prosecution, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 19, at 165-67.
243 John Braithwaite's account of Rudolph Giuliani suggests the benefits of a so-called
hybrid approach that incorporates both regulatory and retributive responses to wrongdoing.
See Braithwaite, supra note 4, at 23.
244 On the structural aspects of corporate punishment, see Garrett, supra note 228, at 914
(discussing forward looking reformist aspects of Deferred and Non Prosecution
Agreements). Despite these limited aspirations to regulate industry through structural
settlements, corporate punishment institutions have been primarily reactive. They
promulgate reforms under an adjudicative umbrella, largely in response to scandals and
violations of law.
245 Charles Sabel and William Simon have been some of the strongest proponents of
"experimentalist" regulation. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 112, at 56. Separately, Simon
has criticized the potential for adversarial systems to drive out more experimental
governance approaches. See William Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 168-69 (2004).
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A. How Punishment Reinforces Non-Punitive Regulation
1. Deterrence
Wrongdoers are deterred when the costs of their conduct, multiplied by the
probability of their punishment, outweigh the net expected benefits of such
conduct.246  The great debates in deterrence revolve around increasing
sanctions or the probability of detection (the latter is often more effective),
imposing monetary or non-monetary sanctions, and determining the
implications of boundedly rational.2 47 Deterrence theory, however, does not
address the extent to which the motivation to punish or regulate affects
enforcement outcomes. This section attempts to fill that gap.
To some degree, punishment reinforces regulatory deterrence. Even if
motivated by retributive aims, a punitive sanction increases the costs of
ignoring non-punitive regulatory institutions. 248 If you ignore fiduciary duties
too often, fail to disclose information required by the SEC, and intentionally
defraud shareholders, sooner or later you will feel the wrath of society. More
concretely, you will lose your house, your friends and family, and your ability
to roam freely.249 That wrath - and those dire consequences - should force
even myopic corporate actors to increase their adherence to institutional norms
and formal laws and regulations.25 °
Like regulation, punishment deters when threats of punishment are
credible.25 1 There may be greater reason to believe, however, that punishers
will follow through on their threats and thereby generate credibility with the
public. To the extent punishers derive pleasure from condemning others,
246 See Becker, supra note 35, at 180; Posner, supra note 113, at 1206.
247 See generally Becker, supra note 35; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 39. On bounded
rationality, see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thalery, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 13, 14-15 (Cass R. Sunstein
ed., 2000).
248 For law and economics scholars, this is the sole justification for punitive fines,
imprisonment, and other government sanctions. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARv. L. REV. 869, 882 (1998).
249 Consider the evocative title of Donald Langevoort's article on how the SEC should
use equitable remedies to punish officers who engage in corporate fraud: Donald
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels":
Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627 (2007). Langevoort was quoting SEC Chairman
Richard Breeden. See id. at 627.
250 For arguments that shareholder litigation could perform this normative task, see Rock,
supra note 158, at 1089, and James Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65
BROOK. L. REV. 3, 5 (1999). Whatever the strength of these claims, it seems unassailable
that the stronger normative "bite" resides with the public institutions that impose
punishment.
251 See, e.g., Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6-8 (1998).
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punishment offers a robust response to the regulatory problem often referred to
as "capture. '252  Capture occurs when well-financed and well-organized
entities regulated successfully lobby agencies for increasingly easier rules and
lighter enforcement; underlying such success is the perceived threat that the
legislature will reduce the agency's resources or narrow its jurisdiction. 253
When capture becomes prevalent, deterrence declines; regulated entities and
managers need not fear regulators who decline to enforce statutes and
regulations. 25 4
Punishment may provide a solution to the capture problem, insofar as it
provides a psychological benefit to public actors. That is, to the extent
punishment attracts public actors who have a taste for condemning others,
punishment may offer benefits that even well-funded regulated entities cannot
match. Eliot Spitzer could not be "bought off" by Wall Street in part because
no financial institution could match his zeal or desire to win. Whatever
Spitzer's drawbacks, no one would have described him as captured by Wall
Street.255
Punishment also may improve deterrence insofar as it creates positive
spillover effects for regulators, either by improving public support for
regulatory agencies or by forcing regulatory agencies to compete by increasing
their own enforcement efforts. 256 At the case level, punishers may be able to
provide regulators with additional information and resources, which in turn
improves regulators' abilities to devise new laws and regulations. At the
policy level, punishment may induce a type of public support for government
officials that transfers over to regulators, either by changing the social meaning
of compliance or altering public attitudes about public agencies and actors. If
the public feels good about the SEC's Enforcement Division, such goodwill
may extend to the rest of the agency.
2. Generating and Reinforcing Norms
Punishment affects how we perceive certain conduct, which in turn alters
the type and degree of resources necessary to restrain such conduct.257 A jail
252 On the subject of altruistic punishment, see Fehr & Gachter, supra note 62, at 137
(detecting instances in which individuals punish others, even at cost to themselves); see also
Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa & Richard McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency
Costs, Law Enforcement and Criminal Procedure (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (discussing altruistic punishment literature).
253 See CROLEY, supra note 72, at 17-18.
254 For a theoretical account of how congressional preferences might affect a specific
agency such as the SEC, see Macey, supra note 222, at 952-56.
255 Spitzer was not alone. Other SAGs have pursued corporate defendants aggressively.
See Coffee & Sale, supra note 211, at 764-65.
256 On the benefits of regulatory competition, see id. at 760.
257 Norms can be either internally held beliefs or reputational constraints imposed by
others. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
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term transforms aggressive or shady bargaining into morally reprehensible
conduct.258
Most corporate chieftains would prefer to avoid fines. But all are horrified
by the thought of jail and the prospect of being publicly labeled a criminal.
Punishment thus has the potential25 9 to improve social norms within corporate
firms, to increase corporate officers' willingness to self-regulate, and to
eliminate conduct that arguably undermines efficient markets.
260
Another reason punishment improves compliance is that it reassures the
employees and officers who are inclined not to break rules that we will hold
accountable those who do.261 Punishment signals to law-abiding employees
that the trust they have placed in others is reasonable and likely to be
reciprocated. 262 Trust improves corporate governance, since stakeholders are
more likely to cooperate with and refrain from second-guessing each other, and
it contributes to capital liquidity.263
B. When Punishment Hurts
Despite its benefits, punishment can undermine regulatory institutions and
practices. I sketch some of its drawbacks below.
1. Puffery and Overdeterrence
Punishment may be problematic insofar as it undermines optimal deterrence
in the corporate context, amounting to little more than puffery in some
instances and overdeterrence in others. First, punishment may amount to little
more than soothing words, particularly when words appear more cost effective
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1582-84 (2000) (explaining the difference
between "intrinsic" norms and "instrumental norms" that confer an "advantage gained from
having the reputation of being a good citizen"); Richard McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 376 (1997).
258 Feinberg, supra note 153, at 27-28.
259 For drawbacks of creating a heightened corporate police presence, see Miriam
Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from
Hewlett-Packard's Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 580-81 (2008).
260 See James Fanto, A Social Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517,
518-19 (2007) (defending Sarbanes-Oxley as a means of communicating social norms).
Like many statutes, Sarbanes-Oxley represented a mix of both punishment and regulation.
Hurt, supra note 19, at 373-75.
261 See Kahan, supra note 218, at 350.
262 Donald Braman, Punishment and Accountability: Understanding and Reforming
Criminal Sanctions in America, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1143, 1162 (2006) ("[A]dherence to
norms of responsible behavior depends in part on the perception that others are also
adhering to those norms.").
263 See also id. at 1163-64 (arguing that punishment can increase "the willingness of
individuals to enter into . . . relationships that inhere in family, work, church, and other
centers of community life").
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and more politically salient than the real thing.264 For example, William
Stuntz's seminal article on overcriminalization, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, suggested that many criminal statutes were more symbolic than
anything else. 265  In the corporate governance context, critics often cite
celebrity prosecutions paired with relatively weak enforcement results as
evidence that the government's punitive bark is far worse than its bite.266
That punishment may be little more than talk is problematic for a number of
reasons. It may create a false sense of security among potential victims who
find credible (at least initially) the threat of punishment. In the corporate
governance context, it may further provide regulated entities with talking
points in favor of less regulation, thereby creating a dangerous vacuum in
which neither regulation nor punishment restrains opportunism and
undesirable behavior.
At the other end of the spectrum, punishment may be far more than talk - so
much so that it distracts attention and whisks resources away from burgeoning
problems16 7 triggers overdeterrence and risk aversion by regulated entities;
fuels costly efforts to avoid detection and cover up mistakes, and perversely
discourages corporate entities from monitoring and reporting wrongdoing to
authorities.2 68 All of these "horribles" can come about when public actors
focus only on the public's retributive motivations without due regard for the
complex manner in which harsh sanctions affect regulated entities and their
employees.
The divergence between retributive motivation and optimal deterrence is not
obvious at first. At least in theory, retribution's core claim - that offenders
should be punished proportionally and in relation to their culpability - bears
264 1 thank Richard Bierschbach for raising this point.
265 See Daniel Richman & William Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecutions, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 610 (2005);
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 531
(2001).
266 See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds -
The Center Doesn't, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1383 (2008) (criticizing the Bush
Administration's Corporate Fraud Task Force as little more than a "branding device" to take
credit for prosecutions that local United States Attorneys were investigating and
prosecuting).
267 Pritchard, supra note 27, at 1078 ("The accounting scandal du jour provides an
opportunity to fulminate, hold a series of show trials called 'legislative hearings' to rake
some greedy businessmen over the coals and then enact legislation to protect 'investor
confidence."').
268 For example, we may punish actors in ways that undermine deterrence, such as occurs
when punishers fail to accord adequate credit to organizations that monitor, identify, and
self-report wrongdoing to authorities. See Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability:
Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW (Keith Hylton & Alon
Harel, eds.) (forthcoming) (criticizing the federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines as
providing inadequate incentives for monitoring and reporting).
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some resemblance to the concept of "marginal deterrence" in economics. 269
Under either framework, the pickpocket receives a lesser sentence than the
armed robber, and the armed robber receives a lesser sentence than the
murderer-rapist. 270
Beyond these happy coincidences, the two approaches diverge. The amount
of culpability someone bears for a given act may differ in translation from the
specific sanction necessary to internalize and optimally deter that same act.271
The psychological characteristics of punishment, in turn, suggest that the
divergence may result in harsher punishments than are necessary to secure
deterrence. 272
In sum, we are left with two opposing but equally vexatious problems.
Sometimes punishment provides little additional deterrence (because it is
cheap talk), and sometimes it induces far more deterrence than society should
prefer in an optimal world. In either instance, our retributive motivations
undermine the regulatory outcomes we claim to prefer.
2. Pretext
Punishment also can serve as a pretext for other goals, such as distributive
justice or expressions of populist anger.273 Punishment-as-pretext not only
distorts social welfare, but it also undermines democratic discourse. 274
In The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, Dan Kahan contended that
proponents of criminal law often used deterrence arguments as a pretext for
what Kahan labeled "illiberal" attitudes. 275 The punishers were unwilling to
admit that they liked or disliked a certain group, so they instead adopted
269 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 39, at
34-36.
270 See id.
271 Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade & Ritov, supra note 44, at 1180 ("[Tlhere is
compelling evidence that the popular conception ofjustice is more concerned with issues of
retribution than with issues of deterrence."); cf KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 87, at 37-
38 (observing that efficiency- and justice-based goals often diverge).
272 See supra Part I.A.
273 E.g., Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1,
32-33 (2010).
274 Richman and Stuntz lay this out quite nicely in their criticism of pretextual
prosecutions:
There is a strong social interest in non-pretextual prosecution, and that interest is much
more important than the "fairness to defendants" argument that has preoccupied the
literature on this subject. Criminal charges are not only a means of identifying and
punishing criminal conduct. They are also a means by which prosecutors send signals
to their superiors, including the voters to whom they are ultimately responsible.
Richman & Stuntz, supra note 265, at 585.
275 See Kahan, supra note 45, at 415.
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technical deterrence language to mask their true intentions. 276 Kahan's point
was that we would be a more transparent, deliberative democracy if we forced
punishers to throw off their technical cloak of deterrence-speak and debate
their true intentions.277
"Desert" can perform a function similar to deterrence. Just as we can define
deterrence in increasingly elastic and ultimately meaningless terms, so too can
we employ "retributive desert" claims on mainly populist grounds.
278
Punishment-oriented institutions then can take advantage of populist sentiment
to advance personal ambitions, institutional interests, or redistributive
ideologies. 279
For example, SAGs and other political actors have been quite happy to
invoke notions of desert in their treatment of corporate actors such as Goldman
Sachs, Bank of America, and AIG. Even if some of the punishment arises
from identifiable wrongful conduct, some has also been fueled by the populist
meme that financial executives became very rich during the economic boom
and will likely stay that way. 280 Arguments against Goldman's shorting the
market for collateralized debt obligations are often paired with invocations of
the bank's billion-dollar bonus pool for 2009.281 Bank of America's alleged
defrauding of its investors came to the public's attention alongside its former
CEO's unfortunate decision to spend a million dollars renovating his
conference room and bathroom. 282 Finally, the New York Attorney General's
threat to disclose the names of the employees in AIG's financial group who
276 Id. at 489-90.
277 See id. at 490-91.
278 Gruber, supra note 273, at 40; Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing
Reform, 96 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1295 (2006).
279 Thomas W. Joo, Legislation and Legitimation: Congress and Insider Trading in the
1980s, 82 IND. L.J. 575, 577 (2007) (arguing that 1980s insider trading legislation
represented Congress's attempt to establish legitimacy and power as an institution "while
distancing Washington from Wall Street"). Donald Langevoort's commentary on Sarbanes-
Oxley is similar: "The regulatory reaction to Enron, for example, might have been far less
about securities regulation per se than public anger that associated the well-publicized social
and economic losses to accounts of arrogance and greed." Langevoort, supra note 232, at
1612.
280 Similar narratives pervade the discussion of insider trading prosecutions:
When [insider trading prosecutions] involve the rich and famous like Ivan Boesky and
Michael Millken, they tap into images of power, greed, and hubris .... Like any good
mythological story, these proceedings trigger richly complex public feelings about
fortune and responsibility, and allow the government to appear as deus ex machina to
pronounce the just desserts.
Donald Langevoort, Re-reading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1329-30 (1999).
281 See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Short Memories at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at B1.
282 Peter Edmonston, Thain Says He'll Repay Remodeling Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2009, at B5.
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received agreed-upon contractual bonuses seemed to have far less to do with
identifiable misconduct than with the SAG's willingness to stoke class-based
anger about uneven distributions of wealth.283
The point is not to question distributive justice arguments or more practical
concerns with large disparities in wealth. 284 There may well be a good case for
increasing tax rates or eliminating corporate subsidies. These arguments,
however, should be debated out in the open and not under the blurry cover of
punishment.
3. Institutional Competence
Punishment is problematic insofar as it matches corporate governance
reform with government actors who, because of their temperament, knowledge
base, and institutional interests, may not be best suited to devise and promote
such reform. 285 That is, punishment may have a tendency to mismatch
punishers with social problems that are better solved by true regulators.
Consider the paradigmatic federal prosecutor's office. Certain
characteristics of the office reduce its actors' abilities to perceive or publicly
acknowledge shades of gray. Generalist prosecutors lack the training or
incentive to grasp the difference between systemic and ordinary risk, to
mediate fluid and conflicting constituency interests, and to react quickly to
unfolding and unexpected events.28 6  These are not merely personal
shortcomings; they are institutional imperatives. The prosecutor's office
organizes itself around the related goals of identifying and reducing
information's complexity in order to craft persuasive narratives for judges,
juries, and defense attorneys. 287  These crude, reductive stories, in turn,
283 Michael J. de la Merced, Cuomo Seeks A.IG. Bonus Information, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
16, 2009, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/cuomo-seeks-aig-bonus-
information; see also Louise Story, Cuomo Wins Ruling to Name Merrill Bonus Recipients,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/business/19cuomo.html
("[Cuomo] also vowed to identify publicly the employees who had received bonuses at the
American International Group.").
284 See, e.g., Robert Frank, Income Inequality: Too Big to Ignore, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2010, at BU5. (arguing that economists should join moral philosophers in worrying about
income inequality in the United States).
285 See Stephenson, supra note 102, at 1423-24 & n.2. For specific applications in the
corporate governance context, see Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the
Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in
PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 19, at 62-63 ("Prosecutors rarely have
sufficient experience working in any business, much less adequate industry-specific
expertise, to make these decisions reliably.").
286 Id. at 63.
287 According to cognitive psychologists, jurors do not weigh evidence individually but
rather construct "story models" that are most consistent with the evidence presented to them.
See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519 (1991). "[P]eople create coherent representations
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persuade juries to adjudge defendants guilty and defendants to plead guilty in
the shadow of likely convictions; all of this meets the public's need for closure
and certainty.288
While promoting closure, punishment also generates a polarized adversarial
system, which causes two second-order effects. 289 First, the personnel that
populate punitive institutions are drawn to them because they prefer high
pressure, confrontational tournaments.290 Second, over time, those who work
in punitive institutions eventually perceive complex corporate governance
issues in oversimplified black-and-white terms.
What does this mean for corporate governance? If, over time, the
prosecutors and enforcement attorneys view corporate officers in purely
negative terms, the policies they espouse may have little to do with improving
corporate governance. 291 Corporate managers may come to view state and
federal prosecutors as enemies rather than as public regulators with a
legitimate interest in mediating stakeholder conflicts and reducing agency
costs. 292 Finally, an overly punitive regime may cause personnel changes
within corporate firms. That is, corporations seeking to curry favor with
punitive institutions may themselves become more punitive internally without
necessarily improving corporate govemance.2 93
from the evidence in the form of explanations, and these representations, rather than the raw
evidence, determine [the jurors'] decisions." Michael P. Weinstock & Robin A. Flaton,
Evidence Coverage and Argument Styles: Cognitive Factors in a Juror's Verdict Choice, 17
J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 191, 192 (2004); see also REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD &
NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 23 (1983).
288 Tyler, supra note 57, at 1064-65.
289 When repeat players are present, however, polarization may decrease. See, e.g.,
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 911, 912 (2006) (examining the "gulf' between "insiders" and "outsiders" within the
criminal justice system and not between prosecution and defense).
290 To that end, punishers may not be very different from their corporate-officer prey.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal
Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288 (2004) (discussing characteristics - aggression, desire to
win - of successful corporate executives and how such characteristics affect efforts to
combat fraud). Recall, confrontation is itself a benefit insofar as it insulates against capture.
291 In contrast, consider James McConvill's positive approach to spurring governance
reform. See James A. McConvill, Positive Corporate Governance, 6 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 5 1,
53 (2006).
292 Tom Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OH.
ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 310 (2009) ("[B]ecause people associate law and legal authorities with
punishment, the instrumental relationship between the public and the legal system is
antagonistic. People become more likely to resist and avoid legal authorities and less likely
to cooperate with them."); see also TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 26 (2006).
293 Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 985-
90 (2009).
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4. Crowding Out and Distorting Regulation
The foregoing subsections have been leading up to the final problem
discussed here, which is that punishment may distort and crowd out both
traditional ex ante regulatory initiatives, 294 as well as more interactive,
experimental forms of regulation often referred to as New Governance. 295
Here again, the argument may seem surprising: over the prior decade alone,
Congress has directed the SEC to enact substantial governance reforms under
both Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank.296 Most scholarly observers contend,
however, that this burst of lawmaking is largely cyclical, whereby regulation
peaks in the wake of economic busts and scandals: "Scandal driven reform
followed by political neglect has been a recurring pattern in the securities
market." 297
The choosing punishment dynamic enriches the regulatory cyclicality debate
that has been the center of corporate law scholarship. 298 It suggests additional
questions that move beyond the usual concerns with hastily enacted regulation.
For example: Does deregulation set the stage for an increase in punishment, as
opposed to a later increase in regulation? Does society's preference for
294 Traditional approaches include command-and-control rules, as well as more market-
or incentive-based regulatory systems. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J.
1163, 1173-74 (1998) (delineating three regulatory approaches, including command and
control, outcome-based standards, and incentive-based systems).
295 New Governance theory encompasses a number of approaches, whereby "[t]he
primary goal.., is to set into motion and then sustain a style of governance that promotes
continuous learning and improvement in a middle ground between top-down command-and-
control methods of traditional regulation and the undisciplined free-for-all of deregulation."
Katherine Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment,
2006 Wis. L. REV. 645, 676-77.
296 Cf Brown, supra note 16, at 678 ("In one obvious sense, the familiar and enduring
disfavor of federal regulatory intervention has not prevailed - we have a lot of federal
regulation. Congress, the executive, and agencies routinely respond to new crises and
attendant harms with revised or expanded regulatory strategies.").
297 Choi & Pritchard, supra note 60, at 39; see also Bainbridge, supra note 61, at 1782;
Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and
Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 396 (2006) (describing the "perverse
pattern" of deregulation followed by investor bubbles, followed by busts, followed by re-
regulation); Pritchard, supra note 27, at 1078 (describing the SEC's overreaction to market
corrections); Robert Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775,
776 (2006).
298 In addition to the sources cited in note 297, supra, compare Roberta Romano,
Regulating in the Dark 2-3 (December 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1974148&, with John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
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punishment contribute to regulation's cyclicality or perceived weaknesses? 299
Would regulation's cyclicality recede were we to find some way to tame our
"tastes" for punishment? Moreover, does the expansion of a regulatory
agency's enabling statute represent a strengthening of true regulation, or is at
least some of the expansion attributable to enforcement-driven punishment?
And finally, is the expansion in regulatory power evidence of a true return to
regulation or of the public's desire for punishment?
All of the preceding questions deserve greater investigation by social
planners and academics alike. There may be no alternative to punishing those
who commit murder or rape (although even here, some will disagree). But
there clearly are alternatives to marshaling vast resources in order to condemn
corporate misconduct and exact some form of retribution. In lieu of punishing
corporate misconduct, we can govern it instead.300 We can treat misconduct as
a chronic condition rather than an acute disease that must be eradicated. This
type of approach, in turn, would clear a path for more regulation (and more
types of regulation) and decidedly less punishment. When we rely excessively
on punishment regimes, however, we reduce the resources available for testing
and improving more experimental governance approaches. That is, when we
rely excessively on punishment, we reduce the efficacy of alternate tools that
might improve corporate governance.
The choosing punishment dynamic therefore carries implications for the
softer forms of regulation that scholars and practitioners have embraced over
the preceding two decades.30 1 Unlike command-and-control style regulation, a
governance model envisions a more experimental, informal atmosphere in
which government agents, stakeholders, and corporate actors exchange
information and gradually identify and adjust to governance challenges. 302
299 See Brown, supra note 16, at 669.
300 See, e.g., David Hess & Cristie Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 310 (2008).
301 See, e.g., AYERS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 33, at 4; Michael C. Dorf & Charles
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998);
Jody Freeman & Daniel Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DuKE L.J. 795, 860
(2005); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 260 (2001);
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343-44 (2004); Lester M. Salamon,
The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1611, 1623 (2001); Jason Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century
Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 820 (2008) (reviewing LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE
IN THE EU AND THE US (Grdinne de Bfirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006)).
302 For a description of New Governance regimes, see Baer, supra note 293, at 1000-05;
Kenneth Bamberger & Dierdre Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63
STAN. L. REV. 247, 308-09 (2011); Cameron Holley & Neil Gunningham, Natural
Resources, New Governance and Legal Regulation: When Does Collaboration Work?, 24
NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 309, 316-30 (2011) (examining the limited successes of two New
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Regulators retain the ability to punish defectors, but the sanction is to be used
sparingly and increase only gradually. According to proponents, the
"responsive" or "negotiated" regulatory approach works because it encourages
cooperation between government and private actors, reduces noncompliance
among private actors, and reduces the government's overall costs of
enforcement. 303
A substantial concern with this softer approach is that it may too easily
devolve into deregulation. 30 4  For example, in the corporate governance
context, Kim Krawiec has voiced the concern that officers and directors may
erect cosmetic changes in their governance structure but otherwise continue to
act in ways that that are harmful to shareholders and society. 305 Professors
Coffee and Sale mount an even stronger critique of self-regulatory systems,
deriding them as one of the causes of the financial crisis.30 6
The choosing punishment dynamic suggests a different and opposing
problem. When scandals occur and moral outrage explodes, ostensibly
cooperative regimes can quickly morph into informal and opaque regimes by
which government actors quickly impose and escalate punishment. This
should not surprise us: when lapses occur, moral outrage is likely to push
government actors to act on retributive motivations. Thus, New Governance
can devolve into punishment as easily as it devolves into deregulation. Hybrid
regulatory/punitive programs, in other words, can shed their regulatory cast
rather quickly. This heralds a loss not only for proponents of New Governance
but also for regulation more generally.
CONCLUSION
This Article theorizes retributive punishment as a preference embraced by
public actors whenever moral outrage is present. Punishment's psychology,
plasticity, and public nature confer political advantages on public institutions
that regulation does not provide. These advantages, in turn, help institutions
compete for legal tools, money, and talent. Although this dynamic may be
applied to other contexts, this Article investigates punishment's effect on
corporate-governance enforcement within several legal institutions.
Punishment offers a number of benefits for a society challenged by capture,
inertia, and an ideological distrust of public regulation. At some point,
Governance regimes in New Zealand through a case study).
303 See AYERS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 33, at 110-16 (identifying numerous benefits
of "enforced" self-regulatory model, including economic efficiency).
31 See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and
Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 357, 358-59 (examining the claim that
New Governance fuels deregulatory efforts); Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and
the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487,491 (2003).
305 Krawiec, supra note 304, at 491.
306 See Coffee & Sale, supra note 211, at 717 (deriding the argument for self-regulation
as "unpersuasive and highly ideological").
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however, punishment may crowd out and undermine more efficient and
valuable forms of public intervention. How we identify and respond to that
tipping point are difficult questions that merit further analysis. Nevertheless,
the foregoing account demonstrates that it is naYve - and somewhat dangerous
- to assume that robust and effective regulation follows automatically on the
heels of scandal and recession. Scandals and economic crises may well spur
public action, but it is not at all clear that they result in robust and lasting
regulation. To the contrary, where moral outrage is high, crises and scandals
may produce distracting sideshows and divert resources to agencies and
divisions that have committed themselves to imposing moral condemnation but
not to addressing complex problems. It all looks like regulation, but much of
the action - and much of the motivation - rides on retributive punishment.
Once the public's desire to condemn dissipates, punishment disappears and
private action remains under-regulated and subject to the crises borne of
market failure.
The study of punishment and its effect on regulation suggests several
avenues of future study. For example, those who vigorously debate the finer
details of how and when we should regulate corporate governance should
enlarge their analysis to consider the effects of retributive motivation on public
actors and institutions that impact corporate governance policy through
enforcement actions and settlements. It is a mistake to think of the SAG, DOJ,
or even the SEC's Enforcement Division as just another regulator in the
arsenal of public and private institutions designed to reduce agency costs.
These institutions act upon and embrace the public's retributive motivations.
This, in turn, puts them in a better position to attract and maintain political and
public support.
By the same token, criminal law scholars ought to reconsider the venerable
project of restoring the dividing line between criminal and civil law. Criminal
law may offer defendants greater procedural protections, but the value of those
protections are easily overcome by the breadth of substantive law. Indeed, as a
result of substantive law's breadth, those protections barely exist when
corporate entities are the subject of criminal prosecutions. More importantly,
the case-level emphasis on criminal versus civil law ignores the broader costs
and benefits that accrue at the policy level. At this higher level of abstraction,
an agency's retributive stances may be far more dispositive of public support
than the formal "criminal" or "civil" label assigned to given statute.
Punishment has always served a core function of public life, and it always
will. We are not about to cease securities fraud prosecutions, nor are we likely
to ignore the public's desire to condemn corporate misconduct. For those who
subscribe to the retributive justification for punishment, this is quite
reasonable: corporate criminals do deserve punishment, and they often have
escaped proportional punishment for the harm they have caused. But we
should be more aware of the dynamics that cause just deserts claims to
undermine the regulatory approaches that are most likely to be of value to a
complex and fluid commercial society. For that very reason, we owe it to
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ourselves to ask how punishment affects the people and institutions that shape
and implement our laws. This Article starts us down that path.
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